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It might appear that the above title puts the cart before the horse.
Record notice and the precaution of searching are mutually dependent;
the fields which they respectively cover are admittedly identical; any
limitation of the one is therefore necessarily an equal restriction of
the other; but since we search in order to learn whether any recorded
instrument is already giving notice, it might seem that limitation of
notice, which is the cause, should precede and determine limitation of
search, which is the consequence. Nevertheless, such a suggestion is
without merit. That notice is 'the cause is not questioned. It is contended that the policy of the recording acts calls for the limitation of
notice. But record notice,1 by which knowledge of a prior convey* This article is to be published in three parts. Part I contains sections I, II, and
III; Part 11, appearing in the March 1945 issue, will contain section IV; Part III,
appearing in the June 1945 issue, will contain section V. References to notes and noteinfra relate to Part II; the rest, beginning with 363 infra, to Part III.
19o2, Harvard University; LL. B., 1913, Columbia University; LL. D., 1930, University of Nebraska. Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. Editor: Laws of Indiana Territory,
I8oo-o9 (1930) ; PoPEs DIGEST, I8I5 (Ill. 1939). Author of PROPERTY (1939) ; Changing Coiweptions of Property in Land (1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. Rv. 691, and of other
articles in legal periodicals.
I. The broad meaning of the phrase "constructive notice," as employed by Mr.
Pomeroy and others, makes its employment undesirable. Instead, "record notice" is
generally used to designate the absolute notice given by a prior conveyance that is properly recorded (docketed judgments being nowhere specifically in question), and "inquiry
notice" is generally used to cover all cases in which the purchaser has actual or imputed
knowledge of facts that should put him upon further inquiry. See 2 PomEROY, EQUITY
JURISPRtDENCE (5th ed. 1941) §§ 6o6, n. 1, 607; and text at and following notecall 202
infra.
Mr. Pomeroy is constantly cited in these pages because his work has for two generations enjoyed great repute (too great), and has been constantly cited by the courts.
Its influence is regrettable.
calls
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ance is attributed by conclusive presumption of law to a subsequent
purchaser regardless of what the actual fact may be, is a pure fiction,
and therefore no objective test can possibly be directly applied to it in
order to restrain its operation; no more than the test of identity of
litigants could be applied to the John Doe and Richard Roe of ejectment under the rule of res judicata. Whatever, therefore, may be the
proper test that limits the common field of notice and search, which
it is the purpose of this paper to consider, it must be one that limits
search directly and only consequentially limits notice. The mutual
dependence of the two conceptions underlies, of course, every case on
recording, and is occasionally explicitly referred to; but any reference
to them which even by implication recognizes search as operatively
2
the determinative factor is extremely rare.
The problem of record notice (and of inquiry notice by documents unauthorizedly recorded) is the central problem of the recording system. Nevertheless, it has received-even from those who, like
Professor Pomeroy, have recognized its great significance 4-virtually
no critical and systematic discussion. In various situations presenting
crucial problems of its application, the very existence of these has
frequently been ignored; and when not ignored they have very often
been disposed of by assumptions, or by question-begging and otherwise delusory reasoning. The present article attempts a general discussion of thp problem. It may be said at once that the discussion
can have little interest for those concerned only with the amassing of
case citations. In several situations, particularly that discussed in
section V of this article, which tests most decisively the choice and
application of basic principles, an attempt has been made to discover
all pertinent decisions, and as respects the problem considered in that
section they are individually analyzed and evaluated. With these few
exceptions, however, individual cases are only sparingly and incidentally considered, textbooks containing collections of cases being
cited for whatever they may be worth. Necessity compels this procedure, for the scope of the discussion is so wide that the consideration
2. In I JONES, MORTGAGES OF REAL PROPERTY (8th ed. 1928) § 673, in earlier editions § 541, one finds such a passage: "As a general rule a purchaser is not bound to
search the records for incumbrances as against a title that does not appear of record.
Generally, therefore, the record of any mortgage prior to the conveyance by which the
mortgagor took his title is no notice of the incumbrance to a subsequent purchaser."
See also comments by Chief Justice Shaw at notecall 442 infra. In WEBB, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF REcoRD OF TITLE (i8go) § x6i (at 255) the author reasons in the order
that a purchaser, because of a rule of law (title by estoppel), "will take subject to the
mortgage, and since this imposes . . . the duty of searching . .. , it follows that
he is . . . charged with constructive notice by its record."

3. See text at notecall 6i infra, and note thereto.
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of individual cases at each step would bury the general argument under
a myriad of irrelevant details.
The discussion will deal necessarily with familiar matters. The
most fundamental of these, however, are so trite as a matter of words
that this triteness has made difficult any clarity of thought respecting
them. Some novelty will be found in the viewpoint from which they
are considered.
Let us assume for a moment that a recording system is initiated
with the intent of forcing all title documents upon the record, inorder
that it may show a complete history of the title. It is obvious (I) that
the statute should provide at least (for this would still leave great gaps
as respects intestacy and other matters) that no instrument operating
inter vivos and ostensibly affecting title should have validity unless
and until recorded; (2) that, if that method of attaining the postulated
end be not adopted, another means of attaining it would be by providing for the divestment of an unrecorded title in favor of a subsequent purchaser, who should therefore, as respects all matters of substance and procedure, be treated as the deliberately appointed favorite
of the statute; (3) that to the utmost possible extent such purchaser
should be protected in relying upon the record, and the burden of
proof in litigation between him and the negligent non-recorder of the
prior deed should invariably be upon the latter; and (4) that stultification of the postulated public policy should never be permitted
through recognition in any manner or for any purpose of any recorded
document unless its recording be authorized and unless the recording
be in strict compliance with statutory requirements.
The public policy just assumed is generally supposed to be that
of our actual recording system. It is proposed to show how very far
we fall short, in practice, of applying the principles indicated as necessary for attainment of the end proposed. As regards statutes, Maryland has retained one of colonial origin 4 that is essentially identical
with that first suggested. But alongside it there also stands a provision that "the deed .

.

. first recorded .

.

.

shall be preferred,

if made bona fide and upon good and valuable consideration." r The
two provisions are, literally, poles apart. (If the "made bona fide"
refers to the grantor the law would, also, be unique in that respect. 6 )
North Carolina's statutes have always been construed likewise to mean
that no conveyance is effective until properly recorded-requiring
therefore a race to the record with priority to the first registered, re172,

4. See note 39 infra.
5. MD.ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) art. 21, §§ i and i7. Cf. Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md.
186, 23 AtI. 736, 739 (892).
6. See text at and following notecall 20 infra.
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gardless, if that were the junior deed, of any notice of it by the taker
of the subsequent conveyance. Since 1885 the subsequent purchase
has been required to be one for value. 7 This transformed a "pure"
into a "qualified" race to the record law, but not into a notice-race
statute. The utter unconsciousness of divergent principles implicit in
statutes of variant wording is illustrated by the Maryland example.
Sudden legislative changes of long continued prior policies are illustrated by that in North Carolina, but they have in various cases been
greater, and prior and subsequent stability less.
To start, as Massachusetts did in 164o, by conceding to the
unrecorded deed validity as between, the parties and their heirs, was
to begin with a policy much weaker than the postulated ideal. To
recognize the deed as valid save as against a subsequent purchaser for
value was a much greater weakening of policy. To give it validity
save as against a subsequent purchaser for value and in good faith did
not, as might at first sight appear, only slightly tighten prerequisites
for divestment of the common law title. It vastly increased them,
because of the looseness of the equitable doctrine of notice; the original
English meaning of that doctrine-namely, actual knowledge of the
prior conveyance and therefore fraud in attempting its divestmenthaving been steadily weakened in American decisions to an utter vagueness. Each of the above changes in the enactment carries the requirements farther from the ideal, making registry of the prior deed less necessary. The same cannot be said whenthe subsequent purchaser is also
required to record first. He is, indeed, subjected to an additional burden, but the general policy of recording is strengthened by the race
between him and the earlier grantee, and recording by him gives
security for the future both to him and those who may claim under
him. Inattention to statutory variations has characterized the entire
history of our recording system. For example, the vagueness of the
ideas still prevalent regarding the classification of race and notice
jurisdictions, and as to the effects of that distinction, is almost incredible. 8
In general, the history of the system has been one of the defeat
of its original, and supposedly still general, purpose by the equitable
doctrine of notice that was imposed upon it by early judicial legisla7. N. C. CoDE ANx. (Michie, 1943) § 47-18. Cf. White v. Holly, 91 N. C. 67
(1884) ; N. C. Laws x885, c. 147, § i. Note, however, that the requirement of value is

literally applied; it is not, as in various other states, made to mean "bona fide purchaser
for value."
8. Compare remarks on Illinois legislation in text at notecall 292 infra, and in note
thereto; on race and notice jurisdictions, see text following notecall 98 infra; on the
idea of abeyance of title (which would imply a statute of the ideal type suggested just
above as point (I) in the text, but which is never discussed with that in mind), see
notes 21 and 87 infra.
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tion. The recording statutes have in fact been made merely an extension of that doctrine. No matter how a statute was worded it came
to be construed as protecting the common law priority of the first
grantee against all later purchasers with notice, so that today in all save
two states that is the law. Moreover, the language of the courts has
gradually been incorporated into the statutes in nearly all states. 9
There was nothing in the statutes for a very long time regarding
the good faith of the subsequent purchaser. 10 There was for a long
time no incorporation into them of the requirement, made in the statutes of Elizabeth relating to fraudulent conveyances, that the protected
subsequent purchaser or creditor must be one who had given valuable
consideration, although the rapid displacement of other conveyances
by the bargain and sale in our colonial period made that requirement
one that normally existed in form, and also usually in fact..' The
statute merely declared that the title passed by a first conveyance (and
which was perfect under common law principles) should stand if
recorded, but if not recorded should be invalid against (in other words,
defeasible in favor of) a subsequent grantee. It is incredible that the
Massachusetts judges, with whom the destruction of the original
statutory policy began, should have seen no difference between saying
that a subsequent acquisition of title was barred because the first conveyance was simply recorded and saying that it was barred because
that deed, being recorded, gave notice, and therefore no subsequent
buyer could take with good faith. Still, since it was undoubtedly
widely understood that recording of a title took the place of the
publicity of conveyance by feoffment, 1 2 the transition in thought was
natural.
It is true that if the notice thus obtruded into the statute,
whether unconsciously or covertly, had been confined to the constructive notice given by the record of the prior deed no great harm
would have been done. In that case, that which defeats the subsequent
purchaser is the fact of the existence of a prior superior title, retrospectively decided by a court to be such. His "notice" is merely
knowledge, imputed to him, of that title's existence and quality. He is
treated as if he knew the fact, and without regard to any question as
to whether he knew the law. But search of the record, though a counsel of prudence if one would avoid a bad investment, is not required;
9. PATTON, LAND TITLES (1938) § 8, n. go, cites statutes from forty-four states
substantially so worded. See also id. § I9, n. 213.
1O. See text at notecall 47 et seq., infra.
ii. Ibid.
12.

See text and notes following notecall 28 iiPra.
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and if it be made, an actual understanding by the purchaser or by his
legal adviser that the title registered is superior is wholly immaterial.
Now, the introduction of notice opened the door to notice of all
types; any notice to the purchaser, accepted as equivalent to the knowledge just stated, excused recordation of the common law title. Hence,
in particular, no subsequent purchase can be made bona fide if the purchaser has inquiry notice. Of course, all forms of notice not only
have the same effect but are also in some ways identical in their requirements. In all cases "bad faith" under the recording acts means
solely knowledge of the existence of the prior and superior title. There
is no "notice" unless the court holds that the prior title was superior,
and no notice unless it holds that knowledge thereof was or could have
been gained. So holding on both points, it makes no difference
whether the record is searched or the inquiry off the record made.
But here the likeness ends, and it is perfectly plain from the cases
that the differences that lie beyond these common principles are either
unperceived or ignored.'3 Reference is not made to the uncertainty of
title necessarily introduced by the introduction of inquiry notice; that
has, indeed, been objected to by Chancellor Kent and others. 14 But
only in seemingly rare cases have judges challenged the inherent injustice that its operation involves in certain classes of cases. To some
extent rules of reasonableness supposedly govern inquiry notice-as
respects the information that should incite inquiry, the sources from
which further information should be sought, the extent to which investigation should reasonably be carried.' 5 The application of these
rules, also, to some types of inquiry notice is relatively satisfactory,
particularly to that given by inconsistent tenancy of the land. On
the other hand they have been almost completely ignored in the large
field of documents unauthorizedly or improperly recorded (where
record notice is admittedly impossible), and in some other situations.
It is here that the operation of-the doctrine results in the injustice
above referred to. All types of notice attribute to the purchaser some
legal knowledge. He searches the record because he knows that an
earlier recorded deed froth his vendor will invalidate that offered to
him. A stranger's possession of the land puts him upon inquiry because
he assumedly knows that it probably rests upon a hostile title. These
are very simple cases. How far may notice, as an equitable doctrine,
go in assuming such knowledge? When a better title is recorded the
mere recording gives the knowledge that constitutes bad faith; and
13. For example, compare statements in PATToN, op. cit. supra note 9, § 14 at notecall 172.
14. See text at notecall 238 et seq., infra
I5.

See text following notecall

252

infra.
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the court decides the question whether it is the better title. When it
is unrecorded the subsequent purchaser is held to have acted in bad
faith if he did not himself acquire that knowledge. In scores of cases
courts have said that he was put upon inquiry, and that reasonable
diligence would have led him to "the facts," when no possible inquiry
could have led him to anything other than a difficult legal problem.
Can a failure to predict the court's ultimate decision be reasonably
called bad faith? What if the problem is one never before decided
in the jurisdiction, or one decided variantly in other states as the
purchaser's legal adviser may inform him? In some cases involving
difficult recording problems a court that only hesitantly recognized
record notice has added in dictum that the purchaser was put upon
inquiry, thus covering its own hesitancy by adding that, anyway, the
purchaser would have been sacrificed to the doctrine just stated.
Finally, in scores of cases involving records that admittedly gave no
record notice the courts have said that at least the record put upon
inquiry the purchaser who happened to see it, thus making a document
unlawfully on the record the equivalent of a perfect instrument properly recorded, and so using the record itself to stultify the public policy
the advancement of which is the record's sole reason for existence.
All this is more than a transformation. It is no mere change in
form. It comes near to abandonment of one policy and substitution
of its opposite. Instead of disfavoring the negligent first grantee, the
courts revert in effect to the favor shown him by the common law
which it was the very purpose of the statutes to deny him. Talking
equities, despite sporadic declarations of the true policy, they minimize
the initial inequity of his failure to record which is the origin of all
difficulties."6 Instead of promoting the policy of compelling recordation, they have steadily in every way devitalized that policy. True, it
can no longer be said that in so doing they flout the declared policy of
the statutes of which they are the guardians, since the enactments
have almost everywhere been so revised is to require a purchase in
good faith. But -though that leaves good faith to be defined by the
courts, it is no legislative license for such restrictions upon the meaning of that phrase as thwart the plain policy of favoring the subsequent
purchaser in order to force recordation. The courts still recognize
that as the ultimate purpose of the statutes.
A reader might conclude by this time that the writer's intent is
merely to denounce and lament "the law." It is much more limited
and not so completely quixotic, although the frustration of the recording system's primary policy is certainly to be lamented. That system
16. See note 43 infra, and text at notecall 73 et seq., infra.
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suffers from two great defects. One is a matter of scattered and
incomplete records, which could be cured in considerable measure by
legislation that is perfectly feasible. The other is one of doctrinal
complexity and uncertainty, which derives almost exclusively from
these same characteristics of the doctrine of notice-fbr they are also
the cause of uncertainty in the definition of a "chain of title."
Notice is an equity doctrine. As such it must rest on fairness
and reasonableness. As respects whom? Manifestly, the subsequent
purchaser. If this fact, often declared by the judges, were consistently
kept in mind, it would terminate disagreement on most points now
contested and give coherence to all recording theory. In section II of
this article attention is given to the question, What was and what is
the actual objective of the recording acts? and to a number of related
matters such as their mode of operation, their relation to equity, and
the distinction between "notice" and "race" jurisdictions. There is
virtually no recognition in practice that reasonableness and fairness
from the viewpoint of the subsequent purchaser should control the
operation of record notice. The title to this article indicates that as
the point principally to be considered. In section I other principles
than reasonableness of search, which have been more or less definitely
suggested as controlling record notice, are briefly considered. In section-III various abnormal recording situations are discussed from the
viewpoint of the test here urged. In section IV inquiry notice is considered in the same abnormal situations. In section V both record
and inquiry notice are examined with reference to an additional problem, that of multiple conveyances by a record owner during the period
of his ownership when one is recorded after he has parted with the
record title.
The main contentions are two: that record notice should be
limited by the search that can reasonably be required of a purchaser;
and that no inquiry notice should be attributed to any instrument
unlawfully recorded.
I
Of course, notice. may be limited arbitrarily; and that is how
courts have oftentimes restricted it, although under the guise of applying tests that are in fact only specious, because either subjective or
indefinite or otherwise unsatisfactory. Some illustrations of such
unacceptable tests may be given.
Not infrequently textwriters and judges have attributed to an
imaginary grantor gradations of conscience in three periods of his
possible dishonesty: before he owns the land ostensibly granted, while
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he owns it, and after he has ceased to own it. For example, Mr.
Tiffany, in justifying exclusion from the field of notice and search of
deeds given in the third period, remarks of a subsequent purchaser:
"He has the right to assume that A, having conveyed to B, would
have made no further conveyance, and he is consequently under no
obligation to search for such a conveyance." 17 This reason is employed by Mr. Tiffany in disposing of problems of the third period
only; and various judicial pronouncements to the same effect have
similarly confined it. Obviously, however, the general principles of
law I would permit of no distinctions in the three situations; one can
no more reconvey land already granted (2d and 3d periods) than convey land one has never owned (Ist period) ; and certainly, as respects
any distinction between the second and third periods, it is impossible
to postulate that either an addition to or subtraction from honesty
results from the rule of the recording system which allows a dishonest
grantor to divest his first grantee in favor of a second. If, however,
Mr. Tiffany's ipse dixit be extended to cover the second period it
would compel him to repudiate the position taken by him, as we shall
see, toward the decisions in that field.1 9 Were the dictum extended
to cover all periods of possible dishonesty it would be patently a mere
fiction, inconsistent with the truth concerning human nature that is
spread in the law reports. When confined to one period, by dates or
relationships to land that have no possible ethical relevance, it remains
equally a fiction, employed merely to justify an arbitrary decision.
In itself, the matter just adverted to merits no further consideration. Nevertheless, because judges rather frequently assert that the
purpose of the recording acts is to prevent fraud, the opinion may be
ventured that such a view, besides being quite inaccurate, brings into
the foreground an ethical element which clearly belongs in the background of any realistic discussion of the recording system. True, the
basis of this is an assumption that dishonest conveyances may be
made. In fact, too, it is set in operation solely by such conveyances.
Nevertheless, the system is essentially amoral. Since the three possible periods, in relation to the record, during which a dishonest
"grantor" may make pretended conveyances will frequently hereafter
be referred to, it may be well to state them at once more exactly than
in the above reference to them. He may make ostensible conveyances
17. 2 TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 192o) 2191.
ing and following the quotation from id. at notecall 338 infra.

See text preced-

I8. That is, the principles relating to conveyances operating by way of uses or
analogously to such conveyances, all of which were "innocent" in the sense that they
could convey no greater estate than the grantor held.
ig. See text at notecall 439 infra.
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of land to which he has never held even unrecorded, much less record,
title; or may, while record owner, successively give to different persons
deeds purporting to convey the same land, all of which deeds save the
first are necessarily dishonest and possibly that also; or he may, after
being but ceasing to be record owner, make ostensible conveyances.
It does not follow, however, that the recording system covers the
entire field of dishonest conveyances, and still less that its purpose is
to discourage dishonesty. Neither of these statements would be
accurate.
As respects the first proposition, it suffices to note (as has
very rarely been done 20) that in the second situation, with which
nearly all cases under the recording acts deal, nothing whatever is
required by them respecting the prior conveyance. They merely provide that the right it passes-whatever right it passes-shall be divestible in favor of a subsequent purchaser in good faith and for value; 21
if not so divested, it may still be voidable outside the recording acts for
fraud or duress or other defects. Similarly, as respects the second
grantee, although he may conceivably be guilty of various other species
of chicanery, and even of a fraud that will render his title voidable,
the only good faith required of him by the recording acts is that he
have no notice of the prior conveyance. That this has not always or
sufficiently been realized is suggested by the language of both statutes
and judicial opinions, and is definitely indicated by the decisions of
the courts.22 The recording system, therefore, is concerned with but
a very small portion of the field of dishonesty in conveyancing.
20. It was noted by Chief Justice Dixon in Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 471
(1872).
21. This is, of course, not common judicial language. Judges frequently speak as
though the first conveyance were "suspended"--whether in nubibus not being stated. See
notes 8 supra and 87 infra. Such a theory is inconsistent with the wording or construction of nearly every American statute since perhaps 1775. The statutes, save in two
states, are held to pass immediately a title good as between the parties. The only theory
that explains the cases is that of divestment; see Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts (1924) 22 Micn. L. REv. 405, on the estoppel and other theories; but see also
the quotation at p. 152 infra. On divestment by the grantor's heir or other rightful successor (devisee, later grantee, administrator in some situations) see also Note in 23
ANN. CAs. I912B, 1289. The point has been decided explicitly in favor of their divesting power in at least thirteen states, with the negative view perhaps prevailing in two.
But in fact the disparity is much greater, for the former view amounts merely to holding (as is presumably everywhere conceded) that the "subsequent purchaser" protected
by the statutes is not one who purchases from, literally, the "same grantor" but from
any successor in interest to a grantor through whom the prior grantee likewise claims.
"In one breath it is said that the title passes by the deed to the grantee and still so
remains with the grantor, that in a contingency it may again pass from him to another
grantee, but if the grantor dies it cannot descend"--in the two jurisdictions mentioned,
and by some older decisions elsewhere that have been reversed--"like all his other titles,
but goes back to the original grantee, with whom it has always remained." Youngblood
v. Vastine, 46 Mo. 239, 242-3 (1870).

See also Powers v. McFarren, 2 S. & R. 44

(Pa. 1815), one of the earliest of the majority holdings.
22. "The 'good faith' of the subsequent purchaser, spoken of by the statute, signifies
no more than that he shall be ignorant, or shall purchase without any knowledge or in-
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As regards the second proposition, one may confidently venture
the antagonistic assertion that the recording system is neither directly
nor intrinsically nor primarily concerned with fraud or dishonesty. It
may possibly, to some extent, discourage dishonesty by lessening the
number of those whose gullibility makes dishonesty profitable; but,
waiving the enormity of that assumption, in its visible operation it
validates the act of a dishonest grantor, as will appear below. 23 The
introduction into the recording system of the doctrine of bona fide purchase has therefore resulted in virtually displacing the system's original
policy by one to which that policy was essentially alien, and this without
commensurate gain, since the scope of the substitute policy's operation
within the recording system does little to advance the general end of
promoting honesty in conveyancing.
Brief reference may be made to other principles seemingly enunciated by textwriters as definitions or delimitations of the field of
notice and search. Mr. Tiffany states the search requirement as the
exercise of "proper diligence": a subsequent purchaser is charged with
notice only when, "if he exercised proper diligence, he 'would, by
searching the records, discover the existence and terms of such instrument." 24 Wholly acceptable so far as it goes, this gives no aid on
the question what are "the records" that must be searched, and leaves
a purchaser to know the law on that point or suffer the consequences
of ignorance. He must search for what would be dangerous to his
title; but what instruments give notice, and are dangerous? Similarly
incomplete generalizations abound in textbooks and judicial opinions.
Mr. Pomeroy states that recording gives notice "to every person subsequently dealing with the subject-matter whose duty or interest it is
to make a search of the records ;" and, again, that a record gives notice
"only to those persons who .
. are compelled to search the records
formation of the existence of the prior conveyance. . . . Bad faith in any other respect, or any other species of fraud or dishonesty, on account of which the conveyance
of a purchaser may be set aside or annulled and his title taken away or avoided in favor
of some third person, the party defrauded, whose claim or interest, legal or equitable,
was prior and superior to that acquired by the purchaser, is not the kind of bad faith
intended by this statute." Chief Justice Dixon in Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 468-9
(x872). (Latter italics supplied.) See WxBn, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13, for quotations
from an early enactment of Ohio containing the phrase "subsequent bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, without notice of such deed"; and from an opinion
in which the Alabama Supreme Court refers to an early statute of that state as giving
priority to a "subsequent mortgage bona fide and upon valuable consideration, where
such mortgage is contracted without notice of the prior incumbrance." Early statutory
language tends, of course, to become permanent, but such language as the above is less
common today than earlier. See also Mr. Rawle's words quoted in text as notecall igg
infra. The confusion remains, nevertheless, in the action of the courts; see text following notecall 73 infra.
23. See text following notecall 65 infra.
24. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2186.
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in order to protect their own interests." 25 But this is merely a recognition of the reciprocal dependence of notice and search, without indicating any limitations of either. His further statement that "Records
are only constructive notice of a title of which they enable a party to
obtain actual notice or knowledge by means of a search" 20 does indicate the limitations of notice given by the content of instruments that
can be discovered, but offers no aid as to what need or need not be
discovered.
Pronouncements in judicial opinions are read as restricted in
meaning by the question in litigation, in order to avoid reading
them as dicta; but generalizations in which a judge cannot properly
indulge are precisely what is justifiably expected from authors such as
those quoted. It is true that none of the quoted passages is taken from
a context in which the problem of restricting notice or search was
specifically in question, and that this doubtless, in part, explains their
shortcomings. The important fact is that nothing better is anywhere
offered; there is nothing further save opinions on special situations,
the merits of which are considered below in connection with the issues
which those situations present; in both textbooks and cases there
appears to be not merely a dearth but a complete absence of discussion
of the general problem.
II
At the very outset of an attempt to discover some rational principle regulative of search and notice it may be remarked that the loose
language in which the requirements of the recording acts are habitually
stated has given to the conceptions of notice and search a false color,
diverting attention from the basic problem which they in fact involve.
25. 2 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note i, §§ 649, 657. To the passage from which the
second quotation is taken Professor Pomeroy appended in the first edition of his work
a note citing Judge Sharswood's similar language in Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. 167, 17,
(i868), and himself pointed out that such language "is vicious reasoning in a circle."
But in four later editions his editors have made no improvements. The context of
Judge Sharswood's language, however, limits it. Mr. Devlin likewise quotes judge
Sharswood, that the record is notice "only to those who are bound to search for it,"
and then, passes (with a "hence") from the situation to which Sharswood applied it,
i. e., that of strangers to the title in question, to the different situation of no-noticebackward to a prior party. 2 D~vLiN, REAL PROPERTY AND DEEs (3d ed. 19H1) § 712.
Here, the phrase is used as though it afforded an answer to the questions, When is
there a duty to search, and why?
26. 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note i, § 658, n. i. To the same effect, 2 id. § 653.
Various of the foregoing generalities presumably come from Kent, who wrote: "The
general doctrine is that whatever puts a party upon inquiry amounts, in judgment of
law, to notice, prbvided the inquiry becomes a duty, as in the case of purchasers and
creditors, and would lead to the knowledge of the requisite fact"-on this last compare
text at notecalls 195, 246 et seq., infra-"by the exercise of ordinary diligence and understanding." 4 KENT, CoMm. *179. The foregoing was reproduced in Jaques v.
Weeks, 7 Watts 261, 267 (Pa. 1838). This is, of course, all quite true, and so are the
propositions quoted in the text; but they are of service only in normal and uncomplicated cases. They are of no value in the difficult problems discussed below, although
not infrequently treated by the courts as though pertinent to and useful in the solution
of these. Compare text following notecalls 146 and 174 infra.
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No statute has ever mentioned search, much less indicated the time or
records over which it must extend, yet we speak constantly of the
"obligation" to search the record, as though it had a statutory basis
comparable to that of notice. The truth is, indeed, known to all who
so speak, but it nevertheless seems likely that such a habit of speech
tends to divert attention from the all-important fact that constructive
notice (and particularly record notice, with which we are here. concerned) must, as Professor Pomeroy says, "find its ultimate foundation and only support in motives of policy and expediency." 27 A proposal to limit notice, or relax "requirements" of search, requires consideration of nothing except the extent to which it is reasonable and
desirable to do so. Save in the very few jurisdictions where the courts
6re constrained by their own precedents in dealing with this question
an answer to it should not be difficult, bearing in mind on one hand
that it is the subsequent purchaser who is to be favored, and on the
other hand that the reasonableness of any search required of him
depends upon the manner in which conveyances are locally recorded
and indexed.
But these last statements assume that it is the subsequent purchaser who is to be favored. This is not to be taken for granted,
however readily many would concede it as another commonplace of
the recording system. In dealing with recording problems as matters
of public policy the courts have differed in opinion as to what requirements of search accord with "the spirit" of the statutes. That depends,
obviously, upon their purpose or purposes, and a consideration of
these is therefore not a digression from but an essential part of the
subject under discussion. Even though the assumption stated be
justifiable it is nevertheless important to establish its firm basis in the
history of the recording system because the courts have, it is believed,
not adequately heeded it as a reason for their judgments, and because
it is therefore, secondarily, desirable to make cleaf the fact that certain
statements in textbooks and judicial opinions that are inconsistent
with the assumption in question have no comparable historical
foundation.
Recording was originally and primarily designed to force deeds
upon the record as a substitute for the publicital element of feoffment; 28
undoubtedly in order to guard against dangers to which that ancient
mode of conveyancing was subject in lesser measure than were the
27. 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note I (4th ed. 1918) 1364.
28. Cf. HUEBNER, A HIsTORY OF GERMANIC PRiVATE LAW (Philbrick transl. 1918)
index s. v. "Publicity," especially II et seq., 183 et seq., 241 et Yeq. Also 2 POLLOCK
& MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISim LAW (2d ed. 1898) 8o et seq. Cf. notes 29
and 3o infra.
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deeds that displaced it. No double danger, from past and future, could
arise under feoffments; the dispossessed owner could not convey; he
must first recover possession, and being thus himself secure his feoffment gave publicity and safety to his grantee-so long as the latter
watched his land. Under the system of conveyancing by deeds that
was vastly promoted and widened by the Statute of Uses (536), and
which almost completely displaced feoffments during the i6oos, there
has always existed the double danger mentioned. A prospective purchaser is exposed under the recording acts to the past danger of a prior
deed-which, if unrecorded, he defeats in a "notice" jurisdiction by
taking his own deed for value in good faith. He is likewise exposed
to the future danger of being himself divested of title in favor of a
purchaser subsequent to himself, which danger he can only escape by
recording his deed. In "race" jurisdictions, both precautions are essential to his safety even as to the past alone. Satisfaction of both gives
complete security to him; his successors face the same dangers with
the same remedies.
Confining attention to the laws of the original states as their
statutes stood in the early 18oos, at least in all save five it was provided either that recorded conveyances should be good without any
other ceremony, or without livery of seisin (mentioning that) or other
ceremony; 29 and although various ceremonies were presumably always
in mind,30 undoubtedly the one primarily in mind was feoffment. In
three of these states and in three others the laws provided that at29. Citations may, for convenience, be made to the third volume of John Anthon's
edition of SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE, entitled AN APPENDIX TO THE TOUCHSTONE OF
CommoN ASSURANCES, CONTAINING THE LAwS OF THE SEVERAL STATES IN THE: UNION
REGULATING THE LEVYING OF FINES AND SUFFERING OF COMMON RECOVERIES, THE MAK-

ING AND RECORDING OF DEEDS, THE FORCE AND EFFECT OF WARRANTIES, FEOFFMENTS,
AToRnMENTS," etc. (I8io).
Various of the laws in question go back far into the i8th or even 17th centuries, but their age is here less important than their continued retention in the statute
book. Included in the first group were Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts,
at 2 (§ 5), 84, 114 (§ 4), respectively; in the second, Rhode Island, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia, at 56 (§8), 379 (§ 4), 499 (§ 5), 539 (§ 28), 595
(§ 4) and 596-7 (§ 1-2), respectively. As was said of bargains and sales in Massachusetts by Judge Trowbridge, A Reading upon the Provincial Statute of Massachusetts
Bay "for Registering of Deeds and Conveyances" (c. x772) 3 Mass. *573, *581 (807) :
"The estate passed . . . without registering the deed, livery of seisin, entry, or any
other act of notoriety."
30. The South Carolina law given in 3 ANTHoN, op. cit. soranote 29, at 539 (§ 28)
read, for example: "No grant, deed or feoffment, deed of bargain and sale, deeds of
gift, or other conveyance

. . . shall be impeached

.

.

. for want of attornment,

or of livery and seisin, or enrolment thereof, or for that such conveyance hath been
made by way of assignment or endorsement on such deeds or grants, without other
ceremony, nor for any other defect in the form or in the manner of the execution of
such deeds or grants, or of the endorsements or assignments thereof, either by the first
grant, or in any of the mesne conveyances derived therefrom, so that the right were or
would have been in the person conveying, if such defects had not happened in the form,"
etc. The fourth section of the first of the two Georgia acts, that of Dec. 24, 1768, 3 id.
at 594, 595, and the first section of the second, that of Feb. 22, 1785, 3 id. at 596, are

similarly broad in scope.
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tempted conveyances by livery of seisin should be effective to create
no more than estates at will.3 1 Finally, in two of the states included,
and in two not included, in preceding groups it was provided that all
recorded conveyances should have the same effect "as deeds of feoffment, with livery of seisin, or deeds enrolled .

.

.

at Westminster"

had in Great Britain. 32 That the primary object of the recording
system was to rid conveyancing of livery of seisin but retain its publicital advantages was recognized in various early decisions in the
original states. 3
Prior in time, higher in right was the original rule of both law
and equity as regarded the interests in land which they respectively
recognized. It is quite evident that "A provision that a deed shall be
recorded, is not in terms or by necessary implication, a provision that
compliance with the statute shall render the instrument more efficacious
than it would have been at common law." 34 The recording of any
instrument, prior or subsequent, might be required merely in order to
give it legal existence. Registration was originally only an additional
prerequisite, in equity and at law, to a deed's validity. Its effectiveness
as a conveyance remained otherwise dependent upon its intrinsic
merits; and if inherently good its registration had not the effect of
increasing its efficacy against a subsequent conveyance. Such was in
fact the interpretation given to the early English registry acts. So
interpreted, any priority given by the statute to an instrument first
recorded was nevertheless subject, as Lord Redesdale said, "to the
nature of the conveyance, the title of the person conveying, and the
rights to be affected by the conveyance;" so that, for example, registration of a deed for land held under a possession adverse to the grantor
could not affect its complete invalidity. Let it be noted also that Lord
Redesdale protested against "the common language of the court" which
31. The laws of Vermont, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts, given 3 id. at I
1), 83, 113 ( I), respectively; New York New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, 3 id. at
197 (§ 9), 244 (§ 9), 287, respectively. New Jersey had provided by an act of 1713, C.
19, § 8, that deeds to uses should transfer the seisin. I NavILL, Acrs OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, 1703-1751 (1752) 40.
32. The laws of Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia, given in 3 ANTHON, oP. Cit.

(§

supra note 29, at 273 ( 5), 319 (§ 4), 470 (§ 4), respectively. The Pennsylvania act,
undated in Anthon, is that of May 28, 1715, cited in note 38 infra. The New Jersey
act is cited in the preceding note.
33. "Whoever attentively examines this subject will find, that the object of this
statute"-13 WM. 3, c. 12 (Prov. Laws ig)--"was to take away the necessity of livery
and seisin, and to substitute a deed, executed in a particular manner, and acknowledged
and recorded, in its place. Nothing more than this is believed to have been intended."
French v. French, 3 N. H. 234, 263 (1825). "The ancient law on the subject of feoffments, which demanded livery of seizin to give them efficacy, we consider as having
been abolished, and that now, enrollment takes the place of livery, and is equivalent to
it." Matthews v. Ward's Lessee, IO Gill. & J. 443, 448 (Md. 1839). The same is implicit in Thatcher v. Omans, 3 Pick. 521, 525, 532, 533 (Mass. 1792).
34. American notes by Hare & Wallace to 2 WHITE & TunoR, LEADING CASES IN
EQUITY (4th Am. ed. 1877) 202.
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suggested that the statute operated on the principle, of notice-the
notion by which the Massachusetts judges began the ruin of their own
35
recording system, and that of this country generally.
That the intent of the earliest American statutes was precisely
that above stated 8eems to be plainly indicated by their statements of
intention as limited to the elimination of mere ceremonies of matter
of form. This also appears in the statements of the effect of a recorded
deed as these appear in the statute books up to the beginning of the
last century. The earliest enactment, that of Massachusetts of 1640,
declared that no conveyance should "be of force against any other
person except the graunter & his heires" unless recorded.3 6 The Pennsylvania act of May 28, I7M5, which was based on the Statute of Enrollments of 27 Hen. VIII, 87 declared that no deed, absolute or defeasible, should be "good or sufficient to convey or pass" any estate in
land unless recorded within six months.38 Such remained the literal
provisions of the statute book in nearly all the states until after the
39
Revolution.
35. See text preceding notecall 12 supra. On the general difference between the
Irish and the English statutes according to Pomeroy, see 2 PomERoY, op. cit. s11pra note
i, § 645, n. i. All the cases there cited are of 1839-1856.
The quotation in the text is from Underwood v. Courtown, 2 Sch. & Lef. *41, *64-5
(Ir. Ch. 18o4). His remarks preceding the words quoted were: "It seems to me that
nothing could be more mischievous than to hold that the putting anything on the registry is notice within the meaning of the word notice, as applied to courts of equity in
such cases, and . . . Lord Killwarden I found . . . was impressed with the same
opinion; though the common language of the Court led to an idea that it was notice.
He considered that language as an inaccurate mode of expressing the effects of the
statute which has its operation . . . without having recourse to the forced construction of the registry being notice. . ..
These words [of the statute quoted] give priority to instruments whether they convey a legal or only an equitable title according to
the priority of their registry, but still according to the rights, titles and interests of the
persons conveying. The words must therefore apply according," etc., as quoted in the
text (Italics supplied.)
judge Trowbridge remarked of the Massachusetts act of 164o, quoted below: "The
makers of this act surely did not intend thereby to enable any person to convey houses
or lands, that neither had, nor appeared to have, good and lawful right or authority so
to do. The act does not ascertain who has, or has not, such a right. The common law
had long before settled that matter; and the provincial act leaves the rules and maxims
of the common law in that respect to take place." Trowbridge, loc. cit. supra note 29,
at *574-5.
36. The act is quoted, with citation to the original in PAToT,
op. cit. supra note 9,
§ 8, n. 83.
37. That is, 27 HEN. VIII, c. 16 (1535), for the enrollment of bargains and sales.
It provided that no lands should thereby "pass, alter or change" unless recorded. Hence,
this-like 7 ANNE, c. 20 (1709), and similar enactments in our colonies, see note 53
infra-was necessarily a race to the record enactment between successive grantees of
the same land from a common grantor.
38. 3 PA. STAT. AT L. (1896) c. 208, 53. This act provided for the optional recording of "all bargains and sales, deeds and conveyances of lands" (§ 2 et seq.), but only
as regarded mortgages was it provided that "no deed of mortgage, or defeasible deed in
the nature of mortgages . . . shall be good or sufficient to convey or pass any . . .
estate . . . unless" acknowledged, or proved, and recorded within six months after
its date (§ 7). On the construction of this compare text at notecall 52 infra; and on
the change made in 1775 see text at notecall 53 infra.
39. Citing again the collection of I81o in 3 ANTHON, op. cit. sufpra note 29, we find
the original Massachusetts provision still in the books of Massachusetts, see 3 id. at
114 (§ 4) (1784), Vermont, at 2 (§ 5), New Hampshire, at 84 (1791), Rhode Island,
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However, notwithstanding this long retention in American recording acts of language inconsistent with an attribution to their framers
of any intention that registration should alter the relations between
prior and subsequent conveyances under earlier rules of law and equity,
the statutes were from the beginning so interpreted by the courts as
to make such alteration the essence of their operation. It may be remarked parenthetically that the inability of a dispossessed owner to
convey, title, which gradually disappeared from American law during
the I800S,40 also made the title of a first grantee, if in possession,
indefeasible notwithstanding that he did not record his deed, 41 thus
potentially precluding any operation of the recording acts in favor of
a subsequent purchaser. Many early cases illustrate these difficulties
of seisin.42 The matter strikingly illustrates imperfections of legislation. For the mere publicital element of livery the register did conat 53 (§2), and Connecticut, at 159 (§9) (1708). Delaware, at 320 (§7) had the
Pennsylvania enactment of 1715, quoted in the text at notecall 38 supra; Maryland
retained an act, given 3 id. at 379-80 (§§ 5,6,7) (715), which declared that no estates
in land should "pass, alter or change, from one to another" by unrecorded deed, and
declared void unrecorded conveyances executed while a similar provision of three earlier statutes of 1674, 1692, and 1699 had been in force, the repeal of said acts notvithstanding; North Carolina provided that no unrecorded conveyance should be "good and
available in law," see 3 id. at 499 (§ 5) ; and Georgia had a provision (at least for the
barring of dower, to which the context seemingly confined it, though general in expression) that all conveyances should thereafter be by recorded deeds of feoffment, bargain
and sale, or lease and release, see 3 id. at 592 (§ 2).
Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Virginia and South Carolina had altered
their statutes before i8io, as indicated in note 53 infra.
40. See Costigan, The Conveyance of Lands by One Whose Lands Are in the Adverse Possession of Another (19o6) 19 HARv. L. Ray¢. 267; Bordwell, Seisi and Disseisin (1021) 34 id. 592, 734-6.
41. Judge Trowbridge referred to the difficulty thus: "Objection. 'But if the estate
passes . . . and the land cannot be conveyed by the bargainor to a second purchaser,
while the first is in possession of it, though he neglects or refuses to record his deed;
the first conveyance will . . . enable the first purchaser to hold the land against other
persons than the grantor and his heirs without recording the deed; against the express
words of the province law, and the evident design of the makers of it..
"Answer. An estate may pass to some purposes, and not to others.

tortious possession of a disseisor would have the same effect."
supra note 29, at *581, *583.

. .

.

The

Trowbridge, loc. cit.

42. Taking New York as an example, see Jackson ex d. Humphrey v. Given, 8
Johns. *137 (N. Y. 1811); Jackson ex d. Bonnell v. Sharp, 9 Johns. *163 (N. Y.
1812) ; Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213 (N. Y. 183o) ; Etheridge v. Cromwell, 8 Wend.
629 (N. Y. 1832). New York is chosen as an example because it has never rid itself of
medieval law. One of perhaps only three states that re-enacted the pretended title act
of 1540 (Costigan, loc. cit. supra note 4o, at 279, n. 3), the Penal Code, § 2o32, still
makes it a misdemeanor for the dispossessed owner to convey; the real property act,
§ 26o, makes his attempted conveyance "absolutely void;" but the civil practice act,
§ 994, allows the attempted ostensible grantee to maintain ejectment under the grantor's
name. In Dever v. Hagerty, 169 N. Y. 481, 62 N. E. 586 (1902), the established meaning of "title" in our law for perhaps six centuries (namely, a right of entry to gain
or regain possession) was repudiated in order to do justice under this jumble of outmoded statutes. By holding in the civil action that the dispossessed owner can convey
the right of entry as a chose in action enforcible in the assignor's name, but still retains
a "title" independent thereof, which title can be released to the adverse possessor (with
the implication that the penal enactment could not have been intended to penalize such
conveyance), the result is to throw doubt over a small area of that enactment's possible
purview, at the cost of repudiating legal history and doing what would in other jurisdictions be injustice to the transferee of the right of entry. The case is probably one
of the most extraordinary to be found in any field of law.
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stitute a more than adequate substitute, and to that extent the objective
of. the recording acts, above referred to, of relieving conveyances by
deed of the dangers to which they, unlike feoffments, were by their
nature subject, was realized. But it was not enough to declare that
recording should be equivalent to livery of seisin. It was not even
sufficient to abolish livery. Complete realization of the objective was
impossible without a further declaration that lack of seisin should not
affect the right and capacity of a dispossessed owner (for a disseisee
was clearly recognized to be such) to convey his title by deed. Our
statute books never reached clarity on this subject. The courts were
compelled to reach sound results by subleties and artifices.
It is perhaps impossible to say just how the transition was made
to the theory of divestment of the first granted title as one actually
valid although unrecorded. Various ideas probably cooperated to that
ultimate result. The original statutes themselves clearly suggested
that, the invalidity of the first unrecorded title was only provisional,
and .curable by a successful race to the record against the second deed.
Then, too, "the common language of the court" in Ireland, to which
Lord Redesdale referred, may very well have existed in the colonies,
for the second half of the I6oos was full of fermenting ideas regarding
equity, and the universally loose and untechnical procedure of the
colonial courts was -of course a kind of equity. There may well have
gradually arisen a conscious desire to expand the operation of technical
chancery doctrines. Formal differences in early enactments are seemingly of no significance. The many colonial acts that followed the
phraseology of the Statute of Enrollments made the prior unrecorded
deed, in effect, void, whereas the group based on the first Massachusetts
act explicitly conceded to it a limited effectiveness; but this difference
relates to the first grantee, not to the subsequent purchaser. On the
other hand the Statute of Enrollments related solely to bargains and
sales, involving the payment of valuable consideration by the bargainee; and although the provisions of the colonial statutes related to
deeds generally, the bargain and sale became virtually universal in the
colonial period, various statutes specifically declaring such deeds
effective without prejudice to "the former" or "the old' mode of conveyance by lease and release. Thus, the subsequent purchaser who
prevailed over a prior unrecorded deed came to be one who in fact paid
value, and it only remained to add the requirement of good faith. How
that came to be added seems fairly clear.
If a landowner made two ostensible conveyances of his land, at
least one was necessarily dishonest. The first might be vitiated by
the grantor's intent to defraud creditors. If on the other hand the
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first conveyance was honest and valid, the grantor was necessarily
dishonest in making the second. Both in equity and in statutory titles
and preambles his act was constantly characterized as "fraud." 43 All,
or nearly all, of the statutes of the eighteenth century are couched in
that language. Indeed, the same idea-although applied not to the
grantor but to the subsequent purchaser, as privy to his dishonesty- 2is still implicit in the many statutes that require the latter to be without
"actual" notice of the prior conveyance (which alone could constitute
fraud) .44 These statutes have never been construed and enforced on
any such theory. 45 As for the old enactments, ignoring any inquiry
as to how far an attempt may transiently have been attempted to apply
them, as worded, against the grantor's "fraud," it seems clear that the
law courts could not have accepted any such vague label, since to them
fraud had the definite and technical meaning of deceit, aside from that
involved under the statutes of Elizabeth for the protection of subsequent creditors and purchasers against conveyances made with intent
to defraud them.4 6 Both of those statutes and also the Middlesex
recording act of 7 Anne (c. 20), though all were aimed against a
grantor's dishonesty that was labeled fraud, protected only subsequent
creditors and purchasers "for value." 47 In these statutes, then, as
43. The statutes being curative, the animus of their preambles is naturally directed
primarily against the secrecy of conveyancing that made fraud possible. In the first
two quoted below, the dishonesty is therefore attributed to the non-recording first
grantee. See text at notecall 16 supra.
The preamble of 7 ANNE, c. 2o (1709) read: "Whereas by the different and
secret ways of conveying lands . . . such as are ill disposed have it in their power

to commit frauds and frequently do so, by means whereof several persons . . . have
been undone in their purchases and mortgages by prior and secret conveyances and
fraudulent incumbrances.

.

.

."

The Pennsylvania act of 1775, cited note 53 infra,

begins: 'Whereas by the different and secret ways of conveying lands . . . such as
are ill-disposed have it in their power to commit frauds whereof divers persons may be
injured . . . by prior and secret conveyances and fraudulent encumbrances," etc. The
Rhode Island statute expressed its purpose to be, "that it may better be known what
right . .

. persons haire . . . to such estates as they offer for sale" (3 ANTHON,

op. cit. supra note 29, at 53) ; that of Massachusetts, "to prevent uncertainty, fraud and
perjury in the transferring real estate" (3 id. at 113) ; that of New York, "for the preprevention of many fraudulent practices, which are commonly endeavoured to be upheld
by perjury" (3 id. at 197) ; that of South Carolina, "for the preventing frauds in conveyances, double mortgages and other collusions, in making over and conveying lands"
(3 id. at 538) ; and that of Georgia (of Dec. 24, 1768), "to prevent fraudulent mortgages and conveyances" (3 id. at 594).
All the acts of the I70os are in terms of "fraud."
44. See the analysis of statutes in 2 PoM~EOy, op. cit. supra note I, § 646.
45. This received strong emphasis by Pomeroy. See 2 id. §§ 59I, 66o-65. See also
Hare & -Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 217 et seq.
46. Those acts carried penalties, which the courts were obliged to enforce. See
4 HOLDSWOnTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISHI LAW (1924) 480-482; I GLENN, FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES (rev. ed. 1940) c. V (A), "The fraudulent conveyances as a wrong," and § 61a. There were various similar colonial acts. For example,
a Georgia statute of 1768 provided that if a grantor or mortgagor gave a second conveyance or mortgage without mentioning therein the former he should be "subject to
the like forfeitures and penalties as the laws of . . . England have provided" in such
case. WATKINS, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF GEORGIA (i8oi) No. 8, of March 7, 1755.
47. See notes 43 and 46 supra.
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well as in the acts regulating the recording of deeds (since the great
majority were bargains and sales), the requirement of value was
present as a merit of the person protected. But at least as respected
the recording acts it would seem that the judges were reluctant to
enforce, literally, the complete invalidity of the unrecorded deed. An
excuse for not doing so could only be found in some special merit
required of the subsequent purchaser, beyond the statutory requirement of the payment of value; and this additional merit was found in
the equitable doctrine of bona fides.4 Thus the change in the general
rules of law and equity respecting priorities which was introduced by
the statutes of Elizabeth 49 was extended over the vaster field of the
recording acts, but under a different doctrine.
In England the law courts never accepted the equitable doctrine,
and the Chancery applied it to unregistered deeds alone. 50 In this
country, however, all courts adopted it, and without the English distinction, perhaps most easily where, as in Massachusetts and in Pennsylvania, no regular chancery system existed. The "any other person
than the graunter & his heires" whom the original Massachusetts act
protected against an unrecorded prior conveyance, was interpreted to
mean a subsequent bona fide purchaser. 51 The Pennsylvania court
48. Various statutes which today contain merely the value requirement are of
course similarly construed. The explanation given in the text is that given in 2 PomER o, op. cit. supra note i, § 665. The New York court, in Williamson v. Brown, 15
N. Y. 354, 356-358 (1857), remarked (per Selden, J.), that the original scruples of the
English judges influenced early decisions in New York.
49. 2 Poy'oy, op. cit. supra note i, §§ 678-68o; i GLENx, op. cit. supra note 46,
c. V (A) and (B).
50. See Bordwell, Recording of Instruments Affecting Land (1916) 2 IowA L.
BuLL. 51-52. "The words of the statute are, that such deeds or conveyances shall be
adjudged fraudulent and void against every subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration. It is to be observed, that the words 'bona fide purchaser' are not used. I
thinlk, therefore, that we are bound in a court of law to give effect to these words.
That seems to have been the opinion of the Judges in the cases cited, although they
thought that a court of equity would, in some cases, interfere to relieve the party. It
is so laid down by Lord Hardwicke, in Le Neve v. Le Neve, and the words of Lord
Mansfield, in Doe v. Routledge, are these: 'Equity says, if the party knew of the unregistered deed, his registered deed shall not set it aside, because he has that notice which
the act of Parliament intended he should have.' He therefore puts it as a case in which
equity would interfere; and the circumstances of this case shew the propriety of our
adhering to the words of the act; for I am by no means clear that we should not work
great injustice, if we were to decide in favour of the defendant." Doe ex d. Robinson v. Allsop, 5 B. & Ald. 142, 146 (K. B. 1821), per Bayley, J. In Doe cx. d. Watson v. Routledge, Cowp. 705, 712 (K. B. 1777), Lord Mansfield actually said, "he has

not that notice"; but later commentators have uniformly ignored the negative, as did
Bayley, J., as manifestly an error. See also Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra,note 34, at
213; argument by counsel in Van Rensselaer v. Clark, 17 Wend. 25, 27-8 (N. Y. 1837).
In Le Neve v. Le Neve, Amb. 436, 3 Atk. 646 (Ch. 1747), Lord Hardwicke attrib-

uted "fraud" to the subsequent purchaser on the ground that he sought priority despite
knowledge of the prior deed, but in fact, as Professor Pomeroy pointed out, op. cit.
supra note i, § 665, he was charged with notice as principal because his agent had received information of which the purchaser had no actual knowledge.
51. This is evident from Judge Trowbridge's comments, although an explicit statement is lacking. "All persons in possession are prima facie capable of conveying and
purchasing. . . . And, therefore, if the bargainee, without recording his deed, suffers the bargainor to remain in possession of the land, and he sells it to another, who
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similarly construed the act of 1715.52

In both of those states, and in

a few others, the statutes themselves were changed before 18oo to
accord with their judicial application. 53 Today this has been done
in nearly every state, with considerable variation of language but with
virtually no difference in judicial interpretation.
Another aspect of the great change that has taken place between
the early and later stages of the system must be emphasized. Consistently with the original view that recording did not of itself affect
the relative merits of prior and subsequent conveyances, the record was
once regarded as merely serving the ends of evidence. Judge Bronson
commented as follows on the situation in New York:
has no notice of the first sale, and that deed is recorded before the first, he shall hold
the land; because in such case the law supposes the first deed to have been fraudulently
made, upon the same principle that it deems a bill of sale of goods, suffered to remain
in the possession of the vendor, to be so.
"The bargainor is certainly guilty of a fraud in making the first or second deed.
If the first was fraudulent, no injury is done to the first bargainee by the second sale.
If the first was a bona fide sale, the bargainor is guilty of a fraud in making the second, and the first purchaser is in some measure accessary to it, by suffering the bargainor to remain in possession of the land, without recording the deed; . . ."-compare Lord Mansfield in Worseley v. de Mattos, I Burr. 467, 474 (K. B. 1758), and
Lord Hardwicke in Le Neve v. Le Neve, Amb. 436, 446, 3 Atk. 646, 654 (Ch. 1747),
or 2 WHITE & TuDoR, LEADING CASES IN EQ uIY (9th Eng. ed. 1928) 157, I64-"And,
therefore, the estate shall pass to one who has been guilty of no fault at all, rather than
to an accessory to the fraud. And for that reason only doth it pass to him, where the
first was a bona fide sale; for if the second purchaser had notice of the first conveyance
before he purchased, no estate would pass to him by the second deed, though recorded
before the first, because it is fraudulent." Trowbridge, loc. cit. supra note 29, at "575-6.
"About two years ago [1770] it was agreed by all the then justices of the Superior
Court, that if, upon a bona fide sale of land for a valuable consideration, the purchaser
enters and continues in possession, without recording his deed, the vendor cannot convey the land to a third person." Id. at *579.
52. Britton's Appeal, 45 Pa. 172, 175 (1863). For the act of May 28, 1715, see
notes 32 and 38 supra.
53. The act of Pennsylvania of March IS, 1775, 8 PA. STAT. AT L. (9oo) c. 706,
412, given in 3 ANTHON, op. cit. supra note 29, at 275 (§ I), was based upon the English
act of 7 ANE, c. 20 (I709), quoted in notes 43 and 50 mipra, which provided that
every deed or conveyance should be "adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration"--good faith not being mentioned-"unless . . . registered . . . before the registering of the . . . deed or

conveyance under which such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim." Similarly, the Pennsylvania act declared any unrecorded deed "fraudulent and void against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration" who recorded his
deed first. See text at notecall io6 infra. Virginia's act of 1785 declared unrecorded
deeds invalid "against a purchaser, for valuable consideration, not having notice thereof, or any creditor." 12 LAWS OF VIRGINIA (Hening, 1823) 154. This indicated that
its origin was one of the Rev. Bills Of 1779; Anthon's print is the act of Dec. 13. 1792,
3 ANTHON1, op. cit. supra note 29, at 466 Q§I). South Carolina's act, likewvise of 1785,
made the unrecorded deed "void" against "persons claiming as creditors, or under subsequent purchasetr]s, recorded [i. e., whose deeds have been recorded] in the manner
herein before prescribed." 3 id. at 542 (§ 45) ; PuBLIc LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA
(Grimk6, 1790) 381-2.

New Jersey, by an act of June 7, 1799, pronounced the unre-

corded deed "void and of no effect against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee, for a valuable consideration." 3 ANTHON, op. cit supra note 29, at 235 (§ 8),
taken from PATERSON, LAWS OF NEW JERSEY (i8oo) 398. I find no earlier appearance
of this in collections of earlier New Jersey statutes. A New York act of April 6, i8oi,
providing for recording in seven counties, employed language identical with the Pennsylvania act with omission of the race-to-the-record addendum. See 3 ANTHON, Op.
cit. supra note 29, at 191 (§ 4), taken from KENT & RATCIIFFE, RISED LAWS (1801)
478, with which it apparently originated.
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"The early usage, and subsequent legislation on this subject
in the colony, was probably suggested by the statute of 27 Hen.
8, Ch. 16 .

.

.

.

The object of this statute, and the colonial

acts, were, however, different. Recording in the one case, was
essential to the validity of the title; in the other, it was only designed to preserve the evidence of the grant. 54 The statute, 27
Hen. 8, was passed at the same session with the statute of uses;
and the enrolment was intended to be a substitute for that public
notoriety which attended the former method of alienation by feoffment with livery of seisin. It was therefore enacted, that the land
should not pass by any bargain and sale, unless the deed should
be enrolled within six months after its date. But the practice of
recording deeds in the colony had nothing to do with the validity
of the title. The purpose for which the record was made is
clearly defined by the recital to the fourth section of the act of
1710: 'Whereas, by many accidents, the deeds and writings relating to estates, some time have been, and may hereafter be
destroyed, consumed and lost, whereby the . . . owner . . .
may be exposed to . . . expensive and vexatious suits, and

other inconveniences.' It was not until the act of April 3, 1798,
that deeds were in any case required to be recorded, under the
penalty of being adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee.

This act . . . now

prevails over the whole state." r5
It is obvious that an abandonment of this evidential theory of the stat
ute was necessary before the recording system could become what it
now is. It is also clear that the question whether a recorded but erroneous copy gives notice only of what the record contains involves the
question whether the record can be controlled (as respects the operation of the recording act) by the original; and this question is seemingly a hangover from the old view of the record as merely constituting
evidence. 56
What, then, is the "spirit" of the statutes, implicit in their purposes? Mr. Patton remarks that "their purpose has been variously
stated as being the original one of securing a prompt recordation
. . . , the equitable one of protecting subsequent purchasers . . . ,
and the constructive one of preserving an accessible history of each
54. The act of 1710 can be conveniently consulted, with other statutes of colonial
New York, in 3 N. Y. REv. STAT. App. 5 (1829). It provided for recordingj and explicitly made the record evidence. The mere wording of statutes does not indicate
when and why the old theory was abandoned; it was presumably by judicial doctrine.
I have not attempted to trace its development and do not know whether that has ever
been done. This subject of evidence is further pursued in the opinion rendered in the
same case on appeal. Van Cortlandt v. Tozer, 2o Wend. 423 (N. Y. 1838).
55. Van Cortlandt v. Tozer, 17 Wend. 338, 344-5 (N. Y. 1837). (Italics in original.)
56. See z JONES, op. cit. supra note 2, § 634 et seq.
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title." '7 Although the last is realized incidentally to and in proportion to the realization of the first, it was almost certainly the chief
and independent objective of the statutes. A fourth purpose, notwithstanding that it has been stated as that of the acts by Professor Pomeroy rs and in the Notes of Hare and Wallace,5 9 may be regarded as
only incidental and also partial, and therefore because of the latter fact
necessarily secondary; namely, that the purpose was to protect those
who might succeed to the rights of the recording grantee. The statutes,
however, were explicitly directed to the case of a non-recorder. A fifth
possibility, declared in the preambles of various early enactments,6 0
was that of saving from improvident investments those subsequent purchasers who searched the record. This is subject to the same remark
as just made on the fourth purpose. A sixth possible purpose, broader
than the preceding, would be that of saving from loss a subsequent purchaser who either searches the record or makes due investigation when
put upon inquiry. To this it may be answered, and as respects the
fifth added, that surely the purpose was to give the subsequent grantee
a title provisionally held by a non-recorder, and although the financial
gain or loss of the parties was doubtless envisaged, it was a consequence of the end intended and not the end itself. Finally, Mr. Pomeroy has said that "Throughout the United States . . . . Whatever
be the language of any state statute, this result of a registration-that
it should be a constructive notice-is uniformly regarded as the most
important object of the entire legislation-the final purpose for which
the whole system of recording was established." 01 No passage could
be more characteristic of Mr. Pomeroy's work so far as it deals with
the recording system, for the thinking is shallow and the exaggeration
of the equitable element typical. Notice is only mechanism. Its result
is two-fold. One is to defeat a subsequent purchaser who persists in
buying; in other words, it protects the prior grantee by not permitting
his divestment under the recording acts. Another result is that above
mentioned of saving a subsequent purchaser from loss.
The mere enumeration of these seven suggestions as to what is
the purpose of the recording acts reveals the absence of any agreement
by the judges (for judicial opinions illustrate all of them) respecting
the policy that they are called upon to enforce. This is their importance as a group. But when one suggestion is balanced against an57. PATToN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 15.
58. 2 PoMm.y0, op. cit. supra note i, § 649.
59. "The object of the legislature in passing the registry acts was to enable every
one who received a conveyance to place it on record for the benefit of those who might
come after him." Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 203.
6o. See note 43 supra.
61. 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note i, §665. (Italics supplied.)
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other, their complete inconsistency makes it even clearer that there
cannot possibly exist a coherent recording system while such diversity
in the understanding of its policy persists. In the absence of agreement regarding that, the protection of the subsequent purchaser may
appear to be a hackneyed principle as a matter of words but it will certainly not be such in practice.
Let us assume that nearly all of the suggested objectives were
probably present to the consciousness of our legislators from the beginning. Still, from a logical viewpoint it would seem clear that the
primary and ultimate end was to record the general title; that the immediate end was therefore to force prompt recordation of each successive conveyance; that the instrumentality utilized for that purpose was
divestment of an unrecorded conveyance in favor of a subsequent purchaser; and that by this instrumentality and through the registry of
the title history all persons dealing with the land would be protected.
But what is most important and manifest is that it was no purpose whatever of the statutes to aid in any way the prior non-recording
grantee. On the contrary it was their declared purpose to nullify his
title, which at common law was perfect. It is equally evident that the
person favored was the subsequent purchaser to whom priority was
accorded in disregard of common law principles. The point would
seem to be self-evident. As Mr. Wade wrote long ago:
"In order to arrive at a correct conclusion, upon principle,
in regard to the conflicting rights of prior and subsequent purchasers, as affected by the registry laws, one of the most pertinent inquiries is, For whose benefit was the statute enacted? Or,
in other words, whom does it protect, and upon whom does it
impose additional burdens? A brief glance at the common law
status of the parties will answer these questions at once. The
prior grantee was secure without the aid of the statute, whether
the subsequent purchaser knew of his deed or not. The [intended]
purchaser had the most imperfect means of ascertaining the condition of the title. The statute was interposed for the purpose of
furnishing him with the necessary information, and in doing so
it was found necessary to impose an additional obligation on the
prior grantee." 62
A hundred statements by judges and text writers could doubtless be
compiled to emphasize these facts, beginning with one by Lord Hardwicke in Le Neve v. Le Neve.63 The principle was emphasized by Mr.
64
Webb and Judge Jones and Mr. Devlin.
62. WADE, A TREATISE ON NOTICE (1878, 2d ed. 1886)

§ 162.

63. Amb. 436, 3 Atk. 646 (Ch. 1747). See note 5o supra.
64. WEBB, op. cit. supra note 2, § 165; Jo Ns, op. cit. supra note 2, § 673; 2 DMlIN,
op. cit. upra note 25, at 1264. A statement by Chancellor Walworth in Stuyvesant v.
Hall, 2 Barb. Ch. 151, 158 (N. Y. 1847), has been particularly often quoted.
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It would be laboring the obvious to dwell longer on the point.
It is certain, however, that the primary principle of the statutes has
been more and more lost sight of in the cases. Its operation has
become increasingly difficult to establish.6 5
It may be here pointed out that a very close analogy exists between the favor shown to the subsequent purchaser by the recording
acts and that shown under limitation statutes to an adverse possessor.
Neither is favored because of his own merits but for an ulterior purpose, for the attainment of which the statutes in both cases operate
to divest one man, because of his inaction, of a higher right that he
originally held, and to invest with such higher right another man who
originally held either (in the case of adverse possession) only a weaker
right or (in the case of the recording acts) no right at all. The limitation acts protect one who is always a wrongdoer, but their purpose
is to prevent stale litigation, and as a means to that end they penalize
the undue delay of an innocent party in seeking judicial confirmation
of his title. Similarly, the recording acts penalize the delay of an
innocent person in establishing a record title and validate a grantor's
wrong, but this result is only incidental to the primary purpose of promoting the registration of deeds. The only difference, in general operation, between the two doctrines is that adverse possession favors
innocent and willful wrongdoers equally, whereas the recording system, since the incorporation therein of the equitable doctrine of good
faith, favors only those beneficiaries of wrong who prove themselves
innocent of even remote or reflected participation therein ;-that is,
innocent of actual, inquiry, or constructive notice thereof. Indeed,
broadly viewed, the recording acts have always, by clarifying titles,
served to lessen litigation. The idea that they, like limitation acts,
serve that end by "quieting possessions" must have been prevalent in
men's minds, for it is abundantly illustrated in the titles and the preambles of colonial enactments.60
65. In one of the very few cases notable for discussion of furidamental principles
Chief Justice Dixon remarked some seventy years ago: "It is true . . . that the statute . . . seems to aim only at the protection of such a purchaser and not at the protection of a prior purchaser, whatsoever the character of his purchase may have been
with respect to the exercise of good faith or the payment of value by him. Indeed, the
object of the statute seems to be to protect the subsequent purchaser in good faith for
value at the expense of the prior one, and to cut off and destroy the title of the latter,
regardless of every other consideration, when his conveyance has not been recorded."
Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 466 (1872). This pronouncement is noteworthy; in part
because it was made after long reflection in a case two years before the court and several times argued, but particularly because, although the conclusion is definite, its measured statement seems to reflect the difficulty with which the Chief Justice had discovered the true principle under the cover thrown over it by inconsistent or ambiguous
judicial opinions. Anyone who reads today some hundreds of opinions on recording
problems will encounter that difficulty.
66. One or two examples may be mentioned. The statute of limitations of 21 JAc.
I, c. i6 (1623), which was the basis of all American legislation, began, "For quieting
of mens estates, and avoiding of suits." A Maryland act of April 19, i67i, entitled
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It is entirely in accord with this analogy to regard the purpose of
the recording acts as essentially amoral. 67 The plain historical facts,
too, show that the first statutes were pure race-to-the-record enactments, quite unconcerned with honesty in any general sense of either
68
the first or the second grantee.

The introduction of the notice doctrine so changed all this that, as
was pointed out at the beginning of this discussion, the judges have
gone far toward reversing the two principles that the first grantee
should in no way, and the second in every permissible way, be
favored.6" When one casts about for an explanation of this, the probability emerges that the frequent reiteration of only half the principlethat all presumptions favor the subsequent purchaser-has contributed
to its own disregard. Triteness begets inattention. Moreover, favor
to the subsequent grantee is only a means to an end, and if an end is
not kept in sight one can readily forget the importance of the means.
This is easily possible in the present case, for if one looks upon a first
and a second' grantee, considering only ordinary equities that one or
the other may claim, there are no special merits in the subsequent purchaser that call for special favor to him. Save in rare cases the prior
grantee is wholly innocent of wrongdoing; equally with the subsequent
purchaser he gives value; and he is holding the legal title. The law
courts could have seen no possible reason for displacing him; and the
reluctance of chancery to do so is evidenced by the fact that they regarded the second grantee's claim to the title-that is, his mere willingness to take what the statute plainly said he should have-as a
"fraud" if he knew of the earlier grant, and succeeded in imposing
upon him (almost universally) the burden of proving the merit of good
faith.7 0 The mere statement of their position, in either form, is one
of manifest hostility to the policy of the statute. They simply overrode it by judicial legislation. And when the courts today favor the
first grantee, in effect they consider only the ordinary non-statutory
equities of the two claimants.
Thus, Mr. Pomeroy wrote:
"A subsequent holder, even for a valuable consideration and
without notice, has certainly no higher right than a prior holder
"An Act for Quieting Possessions" merely validated earlier conveyances, "any error
in the form only, of such writings, to the contrary notwithstanding," if made "by . . .
persons . . . that right had to sell, give or grant such lands." LAws oF MARYLAND
(Bacon, 1765), act of 167I, ch. 6. A statute of June 3, 1715, entitled "An Act for
Quieting Posessions, enrolling Conveyances, and securing the Estates of Purchasers,"
dealt solely with recording. Id., acts of 1715, c. 47.
67. See pp. 133-5 supra.
68. See text at pp. 132-5, 140 supra.
69. See text at and following notecall 125 infra.
70. WEB, op. tit. supra note 2, § 165; PATTON, op. cit. mtpra note 9, at 34.
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1S1

equally innocent and with an equally meritorious ownership
When the originallegal owner has done or omitted something by which it was made possible that his property should
come into the hands of a bona fide holder by an apparently valid
title, it may be just to regard him as estopped from asserting his
ownership, and thus to protect the subsequent purchaser. But
when the prior owner is wholly innocent, has done and omitted
nothing, it certainly transcends, even if it does not violate, the
principles of equity to sustain the claims of a subsequent and
even bona fide purchaser." 71
This passage is in the opening section of the author's discussion of
bona fide purchase. He speaks of "the principles of equity" only; and
in case the fault of the prior grantee makes possible a later purchase
in good faith that grantee's postponement, it is suggested, would be
by estoppel, merely. The recording acts are not mentioned; the reference is to the purely equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase. Nevertheless, there is a good reason to quote the passage. Immediately following it the author, passing to the effects of the recording acts, remarks that "So far as the doctrine of bona fide purchase has been made
a rule of law, either by the operation of the recording acts or by the
independent action of the courts, it does not properly come within the
scope of a treatise on equity jurisprudence." 72 It is certainly a permissible inference that the author will either not discuss at all situations under the recording acts, or will make clear in discussing them
the distinction between the pure equitable doctrine and the "rule of
law" governing those situations. But the fact is that Mr. Pomeroy
passes judgment on almost all the recording situations discussed in this
article, and without any discernible attention to that distinction. For
that reason, and because his work has been cited countless times in
the courts, it has exercised, the writer believes, a pernicious influence
upon recording decisions.
It is justifiable, then, though at the risk of boredom, to reiterate
that the subsequent purchaser, regardless of equities other than notice,
is entitled, the prior conveyance being unrecorded, to preference under
the policy of the recording acts. From that viewpoint the holder of
the prior deed, whether characterized as negligent or as holding title
subject to a gross inequity, has no positive merit whatsoever. To this
inequity of not recording, the courts, as already remarked, have been
insufficiently attentive.7 3 Although frequently both noted and prop71. 3 PomEIoY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 735.

(Italics supplied.)
3 id. § 736.
73. Mr. Pomeroy does, indeed, discuss to some extent negligence as an equitable
doctrine, and with some reference to the recording acts. 2 PoMxoy, op. cit. supra
note i, §§ 61o, 687, 698, 731-2. So do other textwriters: for example, i JoN's, op. ca.
72.
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erly weighted, in the great majority of cases it seems to be treated
as a mere fact.
If the statute is then literally applied, asking only whether notice
existed, and keeping this within reasonable, bounds, this would be the
most desirable way of enforcing the statutes. They refer to the nonrecording merely as a fact. There is no reference in them to any
equity save the bona fides of the second purchaser. If the problem
before the court is solely that of priority under a recording statute, any
reference whatever to the conduct or moral merits of the parties other
than the fact of non-record by one and the question of inquiry notice
to the other is irrelevant and improper. If there be any inequitable
conduct of the second grantee in relation to the first, that is a matter
for which relief should be sought independently of the former's acquisition of the title. The two matters may, of course, be involved in
one bill if the proceeding be in equity, if only through a prayer for
general relief; but in their discussion should be kept wholly distinct.
On the simple issue of statutory priority there is, then, no need to refer
in equitable terms to the negligence of non-recording, but if it be so
referred to-or if a court discusses equities in general-then the
statute, so read, explicitly provides that this inequity is so gross that
nothing, save alone the "fraud" of a subsequent purchaser in attempting
to displace the unrecorded title with knowledge thereof, can save the
-unrecorded deed from nullity. This was impressively emphasized by
Judge Sanborn in a federal case in which defendants contended that
a bank in plaintiffs' title chain had, before conveyance of the title, been
divested by a decree in favor of defendants' predecessor. This decree
was unrecorded. Judge Sanborn said:
"It is true .

.

.

that, in the absence of the estoppel of the

registry statutes, a conveyance of what one owns carries nothing
which he does not own. . . . But the question here is not what
the bank owned when that deed was made. . . . It is what the

bank appeared to own by the authorized records of the counties
in which these lands were situated. The statute and the negligence of the defendants, or of their, grantors, estop them from
proving, or from successfully claiming, that the title to these lands
supra note 2, §§ 684, 712, 736; 2 JONES, LAW OF REAL. PROPERTY IN MODEM CONVEYANCING (1896) § 1583 et seq. Many judicial opinions likewise emphasize it, as in the
quotations in the text at notecall 74 and in note 77 infra. Nevertheless, the net impression on the writer of reading hundreds of cases is that stated in the text. Mr. Webb
recognized that "by reason of the laches" of the first grantee, "one result growing out
of . . . the registry system has been the creation, in favor of a subsequent purchaser, of an equity that did not before exist." WEBB, op. cit. supra note 2, § 166.
There may be many such explicit statements in equity terminology, but the writer has
noted very few. It may be said that everyone assumes the proposition that Mr. Webb
explicitly states. A thing assumed is not usually a matter emphasized. If there be any
such general assumption it leaves slight impress upon judicial action. See also text at
notecall 186 infra, et seq. and at notecalls 228-234 infra.
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was other than that which they permitted it to appear to be upon
these records when .

.

[plaintiffs' predecessors] bought. The

contention that the grantor had nothing when this deed was made,
and hence that the purchasers acquired nothing by it, proves too
much. It applies with equal cogency to the purchaser under
every deed subsequent to a prior unrecorded conveyance, and its
adoption would annul every statute of registration, for it may be
said with equal truth of every such subsequent conveyance that
the grantor has nothing when he makes it, and therefore the
subsequent purchaser can take nothing.
"The argument is fallacious, because it utterly ignores the
purpose, the policy, and the effect of the statutes of registration.
It is the purpose and the legal effect of these statutes to make the
title that appears of record-the record title-superior in the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value to the real title that is
withheld from registration. Hence, while one who has parted
with his title to land by an unrecorded deed or decree"-that is,
even assuming the Bank to have done so-"has no title or interest
remaining in himself, yet his deed to an innocent purchaser for
value, by virtue of the registry statutes, avoids the effect of the
prior unrecorded deed or decree, and vests the title to the land in
the subsequent purchaser to the same extent as it would have
done if the title of record had been the real title. The holders of
unrecorded instruments are estopped by the statute and their
negligence from denying that the record title is the real title." 74
It makes no difference in immediate result as respects the simple,
issue of priority whether one uses Judge Sanborn's language of
estoppel or regards the prior grantee's nonfeasance as participation in
the common grantor's fraud. 75 One may say that "it is the equity
arising from the payment of value under the false impression occasioned by the neglect of the prior purchaser, which the policy that'
dictated the registry acts should protect." 76 Some have even appealed
to the equitable principle that vhen one of two innocent persons must
suffer by the act of a third it shall be that one of the two whose fault
made possible the situation; 77 but this is very unsatisfactory, since
74. Boynton v. Haggart, 12o Fed. 8ig, 823-4 (C. C. A. 8th, 1903).
75. See notes 43 and 51 supra.

76. Notes of Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 4o. The same theory is
stated in WEBB, op. cit. supra note 2, § 166. Its application is illustrated in Brownback
v. Ozias, 117 Pa. 87, 93, 1iAtl. 301, 304 (887).
77. Mr. Patton has referred to all these doctrines as follows: "A grantee who
does not give notice by recording his conveyance negligently leaves the way open for
his grantor to convey to another who has no notice of the prior transfer. Looking
at the matter from this angle, it has bEen said that recording acts proceed upon the
theory that, where one of two persons must suffer by the wrong or mistake of a third
party, the one most at fault, or the one whose fault made it possible that there should
be a loss, is guilty of a constructive fraud and is the one who must suffer; also that
these acts are a legislative extension of the doctrine of estoppel, in that they prevent
those grantees from successfully asserting title who are required by statute to record
their muniments of title, but who fail to do so, to the detriment, otherwise, of a subsequent purchaser." PATTON, op. cit supra note 9, § 19.
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here, as in various other situations, a person is labeled "innocent" by
Chancery only because his fault, gross as it may be, happens not to be
recognized as a technical inequity. That is the very reasoning against
which protest is here made. The other interpretations of the statute's
operation are not open to this pa'rticular objection, but they are open
to the objection that there is no need to read the statutory rule in terms
of any equitable doctrine in order to explain its operation. 75
The common practice of thus reading it is the vice against which
remonstrance is made. Mr. Webb's book on recording, for example,
is underlain by the view that bona fides is the primary element in the
recording acts and that decisions thereunder should be controlled by
"the equities of the transaction." 7 Ithas been pointed out above,
and there can be no doubt as to the fact, that the recording statutes
are not concerned at all with the equitable or inequitable conduct of
the first grantee aside from his not recording, nor with the equitable
or inequitable conduct of the second grantee aside from his having or
not having knowledge or notice of the prior deed. If only the pertinent
equities are weighed, those of the subsequent purchaser in good faith
will always prevail-no more by the literal provision of the statute
than as a balance of equities, for, as Judge Campbell said, "there are
no equities superior to those of such purchasers." Io But if it were
true that the statutes have become merely an extension of the notice
theory, if it were true that since recordation gives notice and notice
is equivalent to recordation therefore nothing but notice or bona fides
is to be considered and there is no other or independent recording
policy-which is the logical conclusion of such views as those of Mr.
Webb-still it would be true that when a court discusses "the equities
of the transaction" it should consider all the equities. And one of
them, under the statutes, must be the statutory inequity of non-recording. That can rarely be held outweighed by anything in the conduct
78. As just contended in the text following notecall 73 supra.
79. He wrote: "There are but few, if any, decisions to be found, which, in the absence of a statute requiring it, hold that the subsequent deed must be first of record.
A question may suggest itself here as to why so considerable a number of the statutes
should contain a provision so clearly at variance with the equity and justice of the matter to which it relates . . ."--perhaps he means, when a subsequent purchaser, though
without notice, fails to record first-". . . The early English register acts were
framed with the sole view of securing an early record of conveyances. . . . In that
stage of the law there belonged to the bare fact of early record an importance to which,
by reason of the changes that have since occurred, it is not now justly entitled. A too
literal copying of the early statutes has, doubtless, occasioned that feature of the modern legislation which still renders the rights of the bono fide subsequent purchaser dependent upon priority of record; but since the equitable doctrine that actual notice shall
supply the want of registration, and that the equities of the transaction shall"-he

means, in his opinion should-"control the bare fact of priority of record, has been

universally'--i. e., except in the many statutes he is criticizing-"assented to and
adopted as part of the law of registration, it should have a consistent application," etc.
WEBD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 15. See text at notecall 121 infra.
8o. Loomis v. Brush, 36 Mich. 4o, 47 (i877).
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of the subsequent purchaser without consciously flouting the statutes.
A moderate degree of attention to this element would of itself go far
to check the extravagances of inquiry notice. The divestment of the
prior grantee has been so hampered by the extravagances of the doctrine of notice, both by inquiry and by record, as to call for every
effort to terminate their progressive enfeeblement of recording policy.
If, in dealing with the recording problem, the party to be favored
is the subsequent purchaser, certain ineluctible conclusions follow.
One is, that the courts should constantly and consistently put the burden of proving notice on the prior grantee, both in inquiry notice and
in doubtful cases of record notice."' "Where an owner neglects to
record his title, every presumption is in favor of a subsequent purchaser." 82 Another conclusion is that such purchaser should not be
defeated by a doctrine of notice that is unreasonable in the burden it
puts on him; and this either as respects the requirement of an unreasonable search of the record, or as respects what puts him on inquiry, or as respects the nature or the extent of the inquiry to be made.
"As every presumption is in favour of the subsequent purchaser, when
the former owner is guilty of neglect, his title"-that is, his right to
the title-"cannot be postponed except by evidence which taints his
conduct with fraud." 83
The vice lies in an exaltation of the element of notice over recording policy; in other words, in treating notice apart from the restrictions imposed by that policy in favor of the second grantee. In suggesting that what is notice to him should be determined by considering
what is reasonable from his viewpoint, or with regard to his circumstances, the seeming heresy lies primarily in the idea that the equitable
restriction upon his rights should itself be restricted in any way. How
Si. Cases turning on burden of proof are not dealt with in the present discussion.
See the new material introduced by the editor of Mr. Pomeroy's latest edition. Compare 3 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note I, 4th edition (igig) § 759, n. i, with 3 id., 5th edition (I941) §§ 785a-785d; which, however, is a mere beginning. The difficulty in these
cases is the same as that in decisions on the burden of proof in some other fields of
law; confusion results from the absence of definite agreement on an underlying public
policy. The question of policy involved as an "inarticulate premise" in the recording
situation is that of choosing the person to be favored; and that involved in wills cases
is the choice between upholding the will or defeating it because, as Judge Lumpkin
said, "Ordinarily, our statute of distribution makes the fairest disposition of a dead
man's property." Reed v. Roberts, 26 Ga. 294 (1858). The courts talk about procedural technicalities and are apparently unconscious of the issue of policy.
82. Pyles v. Brown, 189 Pa. 164, i69, 42 Atl. ii, 13 (1899).
83. Boggs v. Varner, 6 W. & S. 469, 474 (Pa. 1843), per Rogers, J. See text at
notecalls 225 and 226 and note 226 infra.
In the passage partially quoted above at notecall 71, Mr. Pomeroy includes the remark that "American courts seem sometimes to have . . . assumed that a subsequent
title was necessarily the better one." If the cases which he had in mind were those
that give effect to the principles quoted in the above paragraph of the text, he overlooked or ignored their statutory basis. Note also that he clearly considered such
cases to be few, as well as anomalous.
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it should be restricted, if at all, is a secondary heterodoxy. In order
that it may appear in its true proportions it is desirable, in the first
place to comment upon certain excessive conceptions of the role of
equity in the recording system.
One stupendous example of this, above referred to, is Mr.
Pomeroy's idea that the giving of notice (thereby to defeat the subsequent purchaser) is "the final purpose for which the whole system
of recording was established." s4 Another manifest exaggeration
occurs in his remark on the recording acts that "in the practical operation of this legislation the right created by a prior unrecorded instrument is generally regarded as tantamount to an equitable interest,
which may therefore be cut off by a subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer who is in all respects bona fide." s5 This must be dismissed
as no better than an unreflective inadvertence, due to the writer's
tendency to magnify the subject that he particularly loved. There is
nothing in his own treatise to support the assertion quoted."" As
already remarked, the relation between equal equitable interests, considered apart, and that between legal interests similarly considpred,
are alike governed by the principle "prior in time higher in' right."
It has also already been remarked that for three centuries the prior
unrecorded deed has been recognized as a valid conveyance; that the
recording system involves the displacement of that legal title, which
under the common law was perfect; 87 that its rule of priority has been
set aside by the statutes of Elizabeth in order to protect subsequent
defrauded creditors and purchasers; and that the recording acts merely
altered the rule similarly in a different field and in a larger way. As
for the attitude of equity toward the prior legal title, its whole theory
rested, as Mr. Pomeroy elsewhere stated, upon the sound premise
"that the title of the [subsequent] purchaser is really defective," and
that his protection in equity, when one for value in good faith, simply
meant that equity would not aid the holder of the earlier legal title
against such purchaser but left both parties to rely upon their legal
rights in legal tribunals.8" It was the courts of law, and statutes,
84. See text at notecall 61 supra.
85. 3 PoMEROY, op. cit. supra note I, § 758. The sentence ends: "and who has
also obtained the first record." The confusion which this involved is taken up below.
86. Cf. 3 id. § 767.
87. One fifids in some cases such statements as this: "The only rational solution
• . . is that the absolute title rests with the grantor and his heirs in abeyance, to vest
irrevocably only upon the filing of the deed for record." Penrose v. Doherty, 70 Ark.
256, 260, 67 S. W. 398, 399 (1902). Similarly, Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss. 78, 87, 16
So. 390, 392 (1894). This theory is, of course, contrary to the actual interpretation of
every statute, the original deed being perfectly effective, although unrecorded, against
everybody save a subsequent buyer for value in good faith. See note 21 mtpra.
88. 3 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 738, 739. "That this is the true rationale
is shown by an overwhelming weight of authority." 3 id. § 738. "This truth, so
fundamental, and yet so often overlooked, was well stated by Lord Eldon. . . . The
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which-by extending the system to cover equitable interests-made it
substantially a rule of property, contrary to the equitable theory. 9
Nor does it seem necessary or helpful to say that the operation
of the statutes "is understandable only if the earlier created interest
is treated as if it were an equity." 90 For if the prior and actually
perfect legal title be so regarded, then the later "title" which is in
fact a nullity until the statute operates in its favor must a fortiori be
regarded as an equity. Under those circumstances, aside from equities
or inequities created by the recording act the earlier "equity" would
certainly be at least equal to the later,91 and being prior would always
prevail, contrary to the operation of the statutes sought to be explained.
If, on the other hand, the inequity of not recording the prior equity
stand on one hand and on the other hand a subsequent purchaser. who
may not act bona fide, the equity of the latter would prevail when he
did so act. But this is so when the true legal title of the prior grantee
is recognized as such. It is impossible to see how the proposed fiction
is of any service. It is of no service because, as Mr. Aigler has convincingly shown, the statutes actually operate by divestment of the
first grantee's legal title. 92 In applying the statutes, there was no need
to resort either to the fiction of title in abeyance 13 or to the fiction of
reducing the earlier legal title to an equity, since the conception of the
divestibility of such a title was one that had been familiar in two fields
of law for a century before our earliest recording act was passed, and
notably so in the closely related field of fraudulent conveyances. 94
And as that idea has in later time been steadily extended in different
fields of law 15 any resort to fictions has become increasingly undesirable.
We may now pass to another statement by Professor Pomeroy
which seemingly represents another unjustifiable magnification of the
equitable constituent in recording. In fact, however, it illustrates the
slight attention that he (but not he alone nor in particular, when he
chancellor said: 'Is it not worth consideration, whether every plea of purchase for a
valuable consideration without notice does not admit that the defendant has no title?
. . . Every one who is familiar with Lord Eldon's judgments knows that it
was his invariable practice to express his most settled opinions in the form of inquiries,
or suggestion, or suppositions." 3 id. § 739, n. 7.
89. 3 id. §§ 735-6.
90. 2 AIGLER, BIGELOW & POWELL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF PROPERY (I942) 857 n., reiterated at 91o.
(Italics in original.)
91. See text preceding notecall 70 supra.
92. Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts (1924) 22 MicH. L. REv. 405.
93. See notes 21 and 87 sipra.
94. See text at notecall 46 supra as to the latter. It was also familiar in the field
of executory limitations.
95. Mr. Hohfeld was seemingly the first to emphasize this fact. See Hohfeld,
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (1917) 26 YALE L.
J.710, 756. It is so important that it should be a part of any elmentary text. Many
instances are mentioned in PHILRRiCK, PROPERTY (939) 371 et seq., also 68, 92.
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wrote in 1881) had given to recording statutes. This inattention
resulted in a misapprehension regarding them shared by many other
writers down to the present day, and of which various examples, some
of them far more surprising, will be noted here and in later pages.
He wrote, namely, that "the total effect of the [recording] system is
twofold; it both enlarges the scope of the doctrine concerning
bona fide purchase, by extending it to all .

.

.

interests .

. re-

quired or permitted to be recorded, and it adds to the elements constituting a bona fide purchase the further requisite of a registration." o0
If literally read this is an assertion manifestly incorrect and inadvertent, merely to be disregarded.9 7 On the other hand, if a "bona
fide purchase" be understood, as was presumably intended, to include
all that is necessary for displacement of the prior conveyance, then the
statement would be correct as respects all states that require of the
subsequent purchaser prior recording in addition to the requirement
that he be without notice; that is, of all notice-race jurisdictions.
It was pointed out at the beginning of this article that conveyances
by deed left any grantee insecure as respected both the past and the
future."' In this discussion we are concerned with only a subsequent
purchaser as such grantee, and, further, with his attainment of security
as respects the past alone.
It is evident that under a statute making a conveyance invalid
until recorded a mere race to the record would settle priority as between two successive grantees; and because no notice is involved, this
would be a "pure" race-type of statute. Under such, the grantee who
first records gains security in fact as respects both past and future.
We have seen that of this type was the earliest English statute of
27 Hen. VIII,99 and that it was long literally applied.' 0 0 Likewise
that such, also, were various of our early colonial statutes, 10 1 including that of North Carolina which, uniquely, has always remained
such, 102 and including the two colonial statutes in Pennsylvania. 0 3
g6. 3 PO aROY, op. cit. supra note I, § 758. (Italics supplied.)
97. It is, for example, quite inconsistent with his statement elsewhere that "the
subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer must be bona fide in order to claim the benefits
of the first registration." 3 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note I, § 759; similarly, § 757. In
recently reading some hundreds of cases I have noted only one in which it was explicitly contended (by counsel) that prior registration is a part of a bona fide purchase:
Craig v. Osborne, 134 Miss. 323, 328 (1923).

98. See text following notecall 28 supra.
99. See note 37 supra. See also 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note i, § 645, n. I.
ioo. See text following notecall 33 supra.
Ioi. See note 39 supra.
lO2. That state, however, now requires that the subsequent purchase be for value.
See N. C. CODE ANm. (Michie, 1935) §§ 3309, 3311, as to unconditional and conditional
deeds, respectively.
r03. See notes 32 and 38 supra as regards the act of 1715, § 7 of which established
the rule for mortgages, and notes 43 and 53 supra as regards the act of 1775, § 2 of
which extended the same rule to absolute deeds.
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Perhaps it was the complete security attained by such a rule that motivated these enactments; perhaps we merely copied the English statute.
If they represented a deliberate recording policy, it is strange that such
could have been supplanted by an equitable doctrine at a time when
equity was in this country little known and weak (and, as respects
the late 170Os and early i8oos, in great disrepute). Nevertheless, the
courts in some states with such statutes had long, in applying them,
required the subsequent purchaser to act in good faith; that is, they
made a race statute over into a notice-race enactment. This was true
of Pennsylvania.' 4 It has been noted, too, that most of such statutes
had been changed to the notice-race form by the early i8oos.1°5 Under
the enactments of today, a subsequent purchaser in a notice state bears
but one burden, that of taking his deed without knowledge of the prior
conveyance; but he gains only partial security, that 'against the past.
In a notice-race jurisdiction, where he must both take innocently and
record first, he bears two burdens, but he gains security not only
against past conveyances but against divestment in favor of a still
later grantee.
It has perhaps never been easy to say just how many of our
states should be classed as notice or as notice-race jurisdictions. Mr.
Patton is the first to attempt such a complete listing, and likewise the
first textwriter fully aware of the difficulties involved. The mere
form of a statute is not alone to be considered. At least a dozen
states have had, at different times, statutes of two or three types;
sometimes transition from one to another has been remarkable not
only for abruptness but for other reasons-as has been true, for example, in Pennsylvania; 106 an enactment of one type is sometimes
interpreted as though it were of another type-possibly because the
court lags behind legislative changes.
Many general statements by writers on the recording system,
because of a loose emphasis upon the value of first recording, imply
a priority by virtue of that act which it may not have; for example in
notice states, if the subsequent purchaser takes his deed without notice
of the prior deed, though this is later first recorded.' 0° Indeed, standard texts contain a great number of other careless generalizations which
lO4. See text at notecalls 52 and 53 upra, and the notes thereto. Cf. Keller v.
246, 252 (Pa. 1819) ("1715" a misprint for "1775"); Maclay v. Work,

Nutz, 5 S. & R.

5 Binn. 154 (Pa. 1812) ; and remark by Hare and Wallace on the act of March 25,
182o, loc. cit.
supra note 34 ( 4 th ed. 1877) 222.
105. See note 53 supra.
io6. On the Pennsylvania statutes between 1893 and 1925 see I LADNER, CoVEYANCING IN PENNSYLVANIA (2d ed. 1941) § 125, and cases there cited. This was remarkable because of its occurring after so long a practice under a race requirement,
and also for its prompt abandonment. On a remarkable and sudden change in basic
recording policy (on a different point) in Illinois, see text at notecall 292 infra.
107. WEBB, op. cit. supra note 2, at 265.
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in effect imply a universality of the race to the record requirement.
Such are to be found in Kent, who wrote in a race jurisdiction,Os and
in Hilliard, who lived in a notice jurisdiction. 109 In many passages
it was clearly assumed by Mr. Pomeroy," ° and in their notes his successive editors have explicitly included virtually all states in a list of
jurisdictions.'
If one reads the statement that our recording system
"gives a legal priority to the grantee of the recorded deed" 112 thinking
only of a recording made in time in a notice-race or pure-race jurisdiction, and of an instrument taken zwithout notice in either a notice or a
notice-race jurisdiction, it is true; but otherwise the generalization gives
no light. Under the statement that "as between registered instruments
• . . they will generally take precedence in the order in which they are

recorded" there is likewise so much hidden as to deprive it of utility.,"3
It is very extraordinary that Judge Jones, who devoted his life to writing on land law and was educated and lived in Massachusetts, a pure
notice state, should likewise, in passages of a wholly general character,
more than once have implied that a recording by the subsequent purchaser is necessary in order to cut off the prior grantee's title.-

4

It is

extraordinary, too, that Chief Justice Shaw, when discussing a point
of notice in Massachusetts, should have done the same thing. 15 These
illustrations show how easily writers acquainted-even perfectly
familiar-with the distinction between the two types of statutes could
forget it (or else mistakenly assume a vast predominance of the race
type) in generalizations on the recording system. It suggests that
legislators might quite unconsciously shift from one to the other.
Judges, too, might similarly slip-and have. It was a novelty when
the Wisconsin court seventy years ago, in a case already cited, insisted
that its statute, which was of the notice-race type, copied from New
1o8. 4 KENT, Comm. *456; unaltered in later editions, including the I2th (1873),
edited by Holmes, which is the one consulted.
i09. 2 HILLIARD, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1855) 457.
ino. For example, 3 PomERoY, op. cit. supra note I, §§ 757-9, 2 id. § 659.
III. Mr. Pomeroy and his editors have never classified the statutes by the single
notice or notice-race distinction. The 4th edition explicitly attributes the race requirement ("classes" I, 2, 4) to 38 states, and the 5th edition ("classes" I, 2) to 43, though

it was seemingly intended to attribute it to all states. All the New England states, for
example, appear as race jurisdictions. 2 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note I, § 646. Cf.
PATTON, op. cit. supra note 9, § 9, n. Io2-4.

112. Beale, The
GREEN BAG 335.

Origin of the System of Recording Deeds in America (1907) I9

113. WADE, op. cit. supra note 62, § i96.
114. I JONES, op. cit. supra note 2 (5th ed. 1894) § 540, (6th ed. 19o4) § 559; 2
NXS, op. cit. supra note 73, § 1380.

115. "The rule which holds that a prior unregistered deed shall be set aside, in
favor of a second deed first recorded, under which a purchaser obtains title without
notice of the prior deed, supposes," etc. Flynt v. Arnold, 43 Mass. 61g, 627 (1841).
Shaw was criticizing the Massachusetts precedents and adopting the New York view.
With the cases of New York, a notice-race state, before him he might easily slip into
its terminology.
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York's, must be literally applied."1 6

But the Mississippi court found

it necessary in 1923 to contrast again the two types of enactment and
7
the decisions thereunder in various states.
Mr. Patton's citations would indicate only a very slight preponderance of notice over notice-race jurisdictions today. But in view
of the difficulties of distinguishing form from actuality, already adverted to, all of which have been noted by him, we may accept as the
best available opinion the statement in his text that "about two thirds"
of the states have only the notice requirement." s
The distinction directly affects our problem to only a slight extent.
But their connection cannot be disregarded, both because of the number of states involved and because of the importance of the relation
actually existing. We have already quoted, only to disregard, Mr.
Pomeroy's careless statement that prior recording is a part of a purchaser's good faith in a race jurisdiction. Were that so, no decision
in such a state could be of any authority in a pure notice state, nor
could the two groups of states possibly be contrasted in weighing
authority on any aspect of the problem of good faith. But in truth
the two requirements are totally independent requirements. This
would seem to be self-evident. The statutes state two requirements,
and there is no visible connection or possibility of connection between
them except the public policy that is pleased to require each. Suppose
that the purchaser has taken his deed without notice: he is still required
to record first-but it is scarcely correct to say that performance of
one prerequisite "qualifies" him to race for the record. 1 9 There is no
connection between the two burdens. So, too, if he has recorded first
he must still prove, independently, that he took without notice. And
if it appears that in either respect he has failed, a court must of course
postpone him to the prior purchaser, so that it may ignore the other
requirement if it will, or may proceed with it and on it also give an
independent finding. 2 0
116. Chief Justice Dixon concluded the passage quoted in note 65 supra, thus:
"before that of the former shall be." Fallass v. Pierce, _3oWis. 443, 466 (1872). This
is race terminology, omitted in note 65 spra, because its retention in a statement of
general principles is undesirable.
117. Craig v. Osborn, 134 Miss. 323, 98 So. 598 (1923).

118. PATTON, oP. cit. smpra note 9,§ 9 at end, and § io at notecall 11g. In § 8,
dealing with pure-race states he recognizes only two such, North Carolina and Louisiana. In his extremely carefully prepared notes to §§ 8. 9,lO, and ig, a great amount of
information is available on the various points referred to in the brief comments in the
text. Mr. Webb, in i8go, also estimated the notice-race jurisdictions as "about onethird of the states." WEB, op. cit. mupra note 2, § 166; and cf. § 13.
119. Cf. Note (1926) i4 CAL F. L. REv. 480.
120. See note 50o and text following notecalls 527 and 532 infra.

162

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

Some writers, however, have apparently hesitated to accept
these obvious principles. Mr. Webb, for example, felt that "Where,
through the neglect of the first grantor [grantee] to record his
deed, a subsequent party has been led to part with a valuable consideration, a race for registry between the two does not afford a
proper criterion by which their rights should be determined." 121 Mr.
Patton quotes Mr. Webb with approval, and finds it "disconcerting"
that, in the case put by Mr. Webb, the subsequent purchaser in good
12 2
faith might still be defeated by the first grantee's prior recording.
These opinions seem obviously to rest on an assumption that bona fides
is a prerequisite of superior desirability or that it is the primary requirement in the intention of the legislature. Since there can be no
basis for the latter assumption, it seems that the opinions reflect merely
a partiality for the notice doctrine. Manifestly, however, both requirements stand as equals in public policy under the statute. Either one
being performed, there can be no question as to performance of the
other's being a further "proper criterion" of the purchaser's fitness to
displace the prior grantee. Certain misapprehensions respecting supposed effects of a prior recording, other than that of record notice, upon
any claim of subsequent bona fide purchase will be considered in sec2
tion V of this article.1

3

If, then, the two requirements are independent, it is obvious that
a judicial ruling on good faith in a notice-race state is strictly in point
everywhere for both of the purposes above mentioned provided it is
explicit. On the other hand a decision adverse to the subsequent purchaser in a race jurisdiction is manifestly meaningless on the issue of
bona fides unless it is indicated in the opinion that he is lacking in both
statutory prerequisites or in one or the other alone. These considerations become vital in weighing the authority for divergent views on
the problem discussed in section V below. Moreover, some of the
early cases there considered involved doubts concerning the relationship of the two requirements to each other, and present day reflections of those above referred to will there recur.
121. WEBB, op. cit. supra note 2, § 13; compare § 15. See also text at notecall 79
supra. Mr. Bordwell has stated that the addition of the race requirement is "out of
harmony with the view generally accepted in America today that the recording acts
are an extension of the equitable doctrine of notice." Mr. Bordwell agrees that it "undoubtedly . . . makes for promptness in recording." See Bordwell, Recording of
Instruments Affecting Land (1916) 2 IoWA L. BULL. 52. His personal attitude, as to
whether this disharmony is desirable or undesirable, is not apparent.
122. Px Trox, op. cit. supra note 9, § ig, at note and notecall 239, citing Chief Justice Dixon's comments in Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 446 (872), and Rathbone v.
Groh, 137 Mich. 373, oo N. W. 588 (904).

123. See text preceding and following notecalls 376 and 387 infra.
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As a matter of fact it is not clear how widely even the existence
1 24
of the problems that have been briefly mentioned is recognized.
Let us now return to the main line of the preceding exposition of
basic principles. Since the views therein presented must be the basis
of the discussion of concrete problems in succeeding pages, it seems
desirable to summarize them. The objection most likely to persist in
a reader's mind is that much has been said of the subsequent purchaser
as the favorite of the recording acts, and much of fairness that is due
to him, but that after all the statutes have long known no such person,
but only a bona fide purchaser; and that since he must qualify as such,
and bona fides is something readily determinable as present or not
present, that settles the matter.
On the contrary, that misses both the problem and the answer
that has been advanced as its solution.
First, as regards the subsequent purchaser. There is, of course,
no need to protect a bona fide purchaser. Once one is that, he is the
land law's first citizen. The suggestion is that equity should not place
in the way of a purchaser unreasonable hindrances to his becoming a
purchaser in good faith. It is extraordinary that equity should do so,
and particularly strange that it should do so out of respect for an
earlier legal title (which equity, for non-recording purposes, will readily
enough override), when the destruction of that is the declared purpose
of the statute. It has been submitted, with reasons, that the primary
end of the recording acts is still to promote the registration of title. 125
That end, then, should be advanced by the courts, and no secondary
purpose should be allowed to thwart it. The contest is between a prior
and a subsequent purchaser. A benefit is conferred on the latter,
divestment of the former's title, in order to force registration. It is
true that the policy has been sensibly weakened by restricting that
benefit to bona fide purchasers. 1 26 The question, then, is: Should the
noun or the adjective be the primary concern of the courts in applying
the statutes? It can certainly not be denied that these, in their general
character, are, like the statutes of limitation that protect adverse possessors, amoral; 127 that their general end is not to promote honesty; 128 that they are wholly unconcerned with frauds, inequities, or
dishonesty of whatsoever character, as respects either the first or the
124. Mr. Tiffany, in I92O, barely and seemingly hesitantly referred to it, remarking
that in a notice-race jurisdiction "it seems that the last purchaser might . . . be
postponed, even though he purchased before the record of such first conveyance, unless
he records his conveyance before the first conveyance is recorded." 2 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 2192. (Italics supplied.)
125. See pp. 146-8 supra.
126. See p. 128 et seq., supra.
127. See pp. 133-5, 149 supra.
128. See pp. i32-5 supra.
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second grantee, save only the former's inequity in not recording and
the latter's inequity in taking his deed with knowledge of the earlier
one.12 9 Surely, in view of these indubitable facts, it is impossible
to contend that the promotion of honesty in but one respect, and as
regards only one party, is a primary objective to be sought by the
courts. It is in fact a simple flouting of the statute to make that contention against the contestant who is its declared beneficiary, as the
instrumentality through which its primary purpose is to be realized.
To act on such a principle is to destroy the law. The writer will
endeavor to show in later pages that in effect this is what the courts
have been doing; that they are reverting to the common law's preference for the first grantee, and denying reasonable favor to the subsequent purchaser.
Secondly, as respects bona fides. This is by no means a simple
matter. The mala fides resulting from a proper record is, indeed,
simple and objectively determined. To that there is no objection.
The difficulties spring from inquiry notice. More than a century ago
Kent wrote: "The doctrine of notice .

.

. is very greatly surcharged

with cases abounding in refinements." 130 It is so today, perhaps less
so than then, but involving a vastly increased body of cases. The
incorporation into the recording acts of the phrase "bona fide" need
not be held to have involved the incorporation therein of all refinements of the equitable doctrine that have existed or may be evolved
outside the field of recording. When the application of notice rules
hampers the general policy of the statutes or general professional practice thereunder, the rules should be subordinated to that policy.
The recording situations discussed in the remaining sections of
this article all involve, in the writer's opinion, a conflict between the
postulated primary purpose of the statutes and undue distention of the
notice doctrine.
III
We return, then, to the proposition that search and notice should
be limited by considering what is fair or reasonable from the viewpoint of the subsequent purchaser. And in submitting that test it is
not forgotten that Chief Justice Dixon, in a Wisconsin case already
several times referred to which in some respects 131 is a leading one on
the recording system, expressed the opinion "that every consideration
of the subject, and construction of the statute, founded upon the convenience or inconvenience, real or supposed, of searching the records
129. See pp. 151-5 supra.
130. 4 KENT, CoMM. *179.

131. See text at notecall 513 infra, and citations in note thereto.
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in the manner in which they are kept or indexed, is wholly impertinent,
and therefore deceptive and liable to lead to error." 132 This is nothing
better than an assertion that an equitable principle should be subject
in its application to no equitable limitations, a view which necessarily
leads to a monstrous exaggeration of the doctrine of bona fides and to
a corresponding subordination of the primary purpose 133 of the recording acts. The reasonableness of this dictum excluding reasonableness, and of other similar pronouncements, 1 3 4 will be considered in
specific situations, none of which were involved in the case in which
Chief Justice Dixon spoke.
No novelty is claimed, of course, for this test in and of itself. It
has, been applied in judicial opinions to one or another recording
problems; but it has been ignored in dealing with others. It has likewise been employed by textwriters in support of views regarding
several problems; but only spasmodically. It has not been recognized
as a test applicable throughout the recording system, and the absence
of any realization that it should so serve is attested not only by resort
to other supposed tests, sometimes obviously absurd, 135 but by failure
to apply it consistently in various of the abnormal recording situations
about to be discussed, where it alone, seemingly, would establish
harmony.
It is quite apparent that variant decisions in cases involving
limitations upon search may perfectly well be justified by differences
in the forms of record maintained in different states; that is, by the difference between a tract system and one based upon grantor and grantee
indexes. When there exists a tract registry, under which all claims
to or against a definite piece of land can be readily ascertained by a
purchaser without tracing each through a chain of deeds to its source,
courts have held a search requirement to be reasonable which under
a grantor-grantee index system has been held unreasonable, notwithstanding that the actual search required happened to be no greater in
the second case than in the first. 136 Each of the two views was proper,
in the writer's opinion, in the specific cases to which reference is made.
132. Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 476 (1872).
133. See p. 148 et seq., supra.
134. In situations A, B, D, E, and F, stated at p. 167 infra.
I35. Discussed at p. 132 et seq., supra.
136. For example (choosing cases from the situation that receives most attention
in this article, in section V infra) in Balch v. Arnold, 9 Wyo. 17, 38, 59 Pac. 434, 439
(1899), there were available to the subsequent purchaser "a cross-index of all instruments affecting" the land and a book containing abstracts of all these under a tract
arrangement. The purchaser was held bound by notice of all, he had only to "turn to
the proper page of the abstract and find, almost at a glance, a description of every instrument" affecting the land in which he was interested, "whether anterior or subsequent to the vesting of the legal title in his grantor." But in Connecticut v. Bradish,
14 Mass. 296, 3o3 (1817), the court, applying an ordinary system of grantor-grantee
indexes, said: "Bradish had only to look to the registry for the next day, and perhaps
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The test suggested is not intended to be one purely quantitative
in nature, much less a quantitative test to be applied to successive
cases individually.-17 No court has ever gone farther than to ask, as
respects a few type problems that involve important .issues of policy,
whether the necessary search, if notice be attributed to the record in
question, would be so great as to make its requirement unreasonable.
As respects these problems, when the form of local registry is referred
to, as in the cases above mentioned, the decisions have obviously not
been based on the actual labor presented under the local registry in
the case before the court but on a general estimate of the difficulties
that would be presented in cases of the same type, generally. In other
words, the test as actually applied is primarily qualitative, not quantitative. Although, within these limitations, judicial opinions as to
what is reasonable may somewhat vary, there is nothing to prevent a
relatively high standardization of judgment; far higher, seemingly, than
in some other fields of law where "ieasonableness" is the test applied.
It would therefore seem clear that no sound objection can be made to
the suggested test on the ground that its application would be indefinite.
Under tract recording, and in a community in which land transfers
are infrequent, no restriction whatever upon search or notice is likely
to result from such a test. Even under such a system, however, the
problem would inevitably become important with regard to city lots in
any great urban center."'3
It is probably not because of theoretical
objections to the test, but because courts have attended little to the
problem, that the form of the local registry (though it must be assumed
always to have been borne in mind) is generally not even adverted to.
It is implied or stated in countless cases that the field of notice and
search is that of the chain of title. It might seem, then, that here is
the test desired-one that is objective, definite, and well understood.
This is a delusion. The phrase "chain of title" has no definite meaning. Moreover, the most difficult problem of notice and search arises
in a situation (that discussed in section V of this article) where the
only to the next page, to discover this prior conveyance to the demandants. But if he
is required to look one day, or one page, beyond that which exhibits the title of his
grantor, it will be impossible to say where the inquiry shall stop."
137. Although such might theoretically be possible. For example, it might be
agreed that the search (notwithstanding it be desired to avoid this) should actually
be made, and then notice be retrospectively held to have existed or not to have existed
according as the time required fell under or exceeded the time-period adopted as the
norm. Various objections could, obviously, be made to such a rule; nevertheless it
would be wholly objective and definite, and results would be relatively uniform in different jurisdictions so far as the name norm might be adopted.
138. Mr. Hackman mentions that twenty years ago as many as i8oo instruments
were daily recorded in Los Angeles county. Hackman, Indexes to Title Records
(1924) 17 LAW. & BANK. 26, 27. New York City, since 1887, has had a modified tract
system, conveyances affecting each city block being recorded in a special volume individually indexed. N. Y. Laws (1887) c. 718, cited in McCormick, Possible Improve-mentsin the Recording Acts (1924) 31 W. VA. L. Q. 79, 83.
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deed in question, if not in the "chain" of title (which, like a "chain"
of causation, perhaps does not, in a strict sense, exist), is at least
given by a record owner and within the period of his record ownership.
But assume agreement in defining the chain of title, and assume
an agreement that no recorded instrument that does not fall within
the definition can give constructive notice, so that no search is necessary for security against it ;--this would amount merely to an application of the test of reasonable search. For, impliedly if not explicitly,
it is held unreasonable to require that the purchaser shall investigate
other claims than those by which he is endangered. The question is,
then, what claims do endanger him, and the answer given in such cases
is that they are those evidenced by deeds in the prospective buyer's
chain of title.
The problem is presented, at least primarily, in six situations:
(A) that of deeds given by persons who are either strangers to the actual title or strangers to, because unconnected with, the record title:
(B) that of easements in Blackacre, the tract in which the prospective
purchaser is interested, that are created by deeds conveying neighboring tracts and are unmentioned in the chain of deeds transferring
Blackacre; (C) that of instruments unauthorizedly recorded because
lacking in compliance with statutory formalities, particularly the requirement of acknowledgment; and, finally the three situations (D,
E, and F) of dishonest deeds given in the three possible periods of
the maker's relation to the record: before he holds any title, while he
holds record title, and after he has parted with record title. These
six situations will now be considered seriatim with two exceptions.
The first and last of the group of three last mentioned will be discussed, as respects record notice, together. Before considering the
second of those three, one problem that arises or may arise in all six
situations-namely, the nature and effects of any inquiry to which a
purchaser should be put by recorded instruments that admittedly give
no record notice-will then be discussed at one time (in section IV)
as respects all save the second of the three last mentioned. The rest of
the article (section V) will be devoted to the various aspects of that
exceptionally important problem.
All six of these situations are obviously abnormal. Countless generalizations respecting the recording system that are helpful or at the
worst innocuous when applied to its operation in normal cases, are
wholly misleading as regards these abnormal problems. Some of these
generalizations have been referred to in the opening pages of this discussion; others will be noted in connection with the several situations
just indicated.
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It seems desirable, first of all, to place them in perspective. In
the first place, one of them-that of cases involving inquiry noticealthough utterly abnormal from the point of view of the original
recording acts, is a wholly normal part, and as respects litigation
39
probably the preponderant part, of the present recording system.1
The other problems all lie on the periphery of the system, each of them
posing the question of its proper delimitation, and this question involving in each case the purpose of the statutes and the question of
restricting notice. Thus, although a proper solution of them, even of
all together, might seem to be only a small part of the general problem
of improving the recording system, yet their proper treatment is of
vital importance because they involve variant opinions respecting its
basic principles.
Situation A
A prospective purchaser of Blackacre normally-finds one chain of
deeds that have successively carried the title. It is agreed, however,
by everybody that his safety requires a search for all deeds given by
past owners which constitute claims to it conflicting with the one held
by his vendor, provided such deeds have been recorded at such time
and in such form as result in giving him constructive notice. This
proviso is the matter to be here discussed.
In the first place, it is manifest that, as Lord Coke remarked,
"none but effectual deeds ought to be inrolled." 140 Also, obviously,
no record notice can arise from a deed ostensibly conveying land that
is given by a stranger to the actual title, since* record notice exists
solely for the protection of persons who register instruments that
affect the title either at law or in equity. 41' Being nullities, no failure
to search for them can prejudice the purchaser even if they could be
found, which ordinarily they could not be; and if accidentally discovered, disregard of them would be equally unprejudicial.
Assume next two complete recorded titles deraigning from A and
B and with no connection between the two chains, and that B's begins
with an invalid claim of title by adverse possession, or with an invalid
139. "A majority of the decisions thereunder are based upon the doctrine of notice." PATTON, op. cit. supra note 9, § 363. And it seems fair to assume that cases relating to inquiry would preponderate over those construing statutes with respect to the
situations of abnormal record notice discussed in this section. The question of normal
record notice is, of course, of relatively slight prominence.
140. "An Exposition upon the Statute of 27 H. 8. ca. I6 intitled, An Act concerning Inrolments of Bargaines, and Contracts of Lands and Tenements," in 2 CoxF, INsT.
PART IL *671 at notecall 6. Many present-day statutes, in stating the recorder's duties, limit them to instruments "entitled to record," refer to "conveyances" (assuming
validity as such), etc. Some provide for remedies in event of failure or refusal to record. Obviously, however, some discretion must be exercised.
141. On the peculiar situation in Illinois, see text at notecall 292 infra.
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state land certificate, or the like. Such cases are those of hostile and
distinct titles, and the question of "superiority between them depends,
not upon their being recorded, but upon their intrinsic merits." 142
The deeds in B's chain are nullities, and a purchaser claiming thereunder must fail because he cannot be a purchaser. But would the
valid deeds in A's chain give B notice, so that---even could he be a
purchaser-he could not be one in good faith?
At this point it may be remarked that in the present situation the
recording acts do not affect the fact that a man who has no title can
convey none, and that no would-be purchaser can be a purchaser merely
because he gives value, whatever his innocence. Those statutes presuppose a title holder who gives title to a first grantee, but who, though
left without title, retains a power to divest his first grantee and give
title to a second under the conditions imposed by the statutes. This
distinction, between the facts to which the general legal rule and the
recording acts respectively apply, has occasionally seemingly been overlooked. The answer to the question just stated, regarding notice to B,
is here irrelevant to the fate of one claiming under B, whereas it is
vital to the rights of the subsequent purchaser in the broken-record
situation next to be stated.
The answer to the question depends upon that given to two other
questions. The first of these is, whether a recorded instrument affecting title "gives notice to all the world ;" and the second is, what is the
true meaning of the phrase "subsequent purchaser." It was in the
cases dealing with the two problems now under consideration that the
accepted answers to those questions were established. A "subsequent"
purchaser is one who takes (or, in a race jurisdiction, takes and
records) a deed either from the same grantor from whom the "prior"
purchaser earlier took a deed covering the same land, 143 or from a
person whose rights run back to and through a grantor common to
the title-chains of the two purchasers but appearing of earlier date in
the chain of the "prior" purchaser. 144 A recorded instrument, if it
actually affects the title, gives record notice to persons whose claims
run through it and depend upon the rights of its maker when he made
it. The recording statutes have application only to conflicting claims
op. cit. supranote i, § 658.
143. Of course, the same quantity of land need not be covered by the two deeds.
One may convey a portion of that conveyed by the other; but it is contended in the
discussion of situation B that in this case the record title of the land conveyed by both
must be in the same person when both such deeds are given. See text following notecall 152 infra.
144. Under a tract system such as is described at notecall 136 supra, "subsequent
142. 2 POMEROY,

purchaser" means, in effect, subsequent purchaser of the same land; under the usual
system of grantor-grantee indexes it means subsequent purchaser of the same land
tracing title through a common grantor. See especially Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J.
L_ 199, 96 Atl. 94 (1915).
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running thus through a common record owner. The case of totally
unconnected lines of record title is beyond their purview. Accordingly,
1 45
between such lines notice is inoperative.

A situation distinguishable in form but not in substance from the
foregoing is presented when a grantee from 0, the true owner, fails
to record his deed but conveys to another who does record; so that
both are unconnected with, and in that sense strangers to, the record
title. Does the recorded deed of the sub-grantee give constructive
notice to purchasers who rely upon another chain through 0? With
1 46
substantial unanimity it is held that it does not.
As problems of record notice there is no distinction; the two
situations involve the same principles. In both it is habitual with the
courts to say that the recorded instruments in question "are not in the
purchaser's chain of title," or that "there is a break in the hostile
chain," or that the two chains embody "distinct and hostile titles."
But these are merely descriptions of situations in which notice should
be held non-existent. They are not in themselves statements of any
reason for excluding notice. Obviously, the reason is that it would
be utterly unreasonable to require a search which, logically, would
require-in jurisdictions employing the usual grantor and grantee indexes-investigation of deeds given by every person entered in those
indexes. This is recognized by Mr. Pomeroy and Mr. Tiffany as the
reason in their comments upon broken record titles. 1 47 It is also so
recognized in many judicial opinions. "In such cases, notice in fact
by a record could not be given." Hence no constructive notice should
exist. "No point of commencement for an examination of the records
would be suggested to the party seeking information therein. The
indexes . . . would give no aid in such an examination. It is,
therefore, our conclusion that the term subsequent purchaser .

.

. is

used to describe purchasers claiming under some common grantor." 148
145. For cases, see 2 PoMERoY, op. cit. supra note I, § 658; 2 TIFFANY, op. Cit.
supra note 17, at 2186 et seq. (see 3d ed. if text of 2186 is pied) ; 2 DLIN, op. cit.
supra note 25, § 713; I JONES, op. cit. supra note 2, §§ 673, 682.
146. The cases will be found through the citations in note 145 supra. Aliter under
a tract reording system. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Tinker, 22 S. D. 427, x18 N. W.
700 (19o8). That case is also interesting for other points, as islikewise Pyles v.
Brown, 189 Pa. 164, 42 Atl. 1i (1899). One point in the latter, which is obviously
sound under the usual grantor and grantee index system, but rarely comes into view
in the cases, is the fact that notice under the statutes requires search only for deeds
given by former record owners, not for deeds given to them, nor therefore for recitals
in the latter.
147. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2188; 2 POEROY, op. cit. supra note I,
§ 761. "The policy of the recording acts is that those persons who are affected with
constructive notice should be able to obtain an actual notice, and even full knowledge,"
-in the case of record notice, surely the later-"by means of a search." 2 id. § 653.
See text at notecall 26 supra and citations in the note thereto.
148. Rankin v. Miller, 43 Iowa ii, ig (1876). (Italics 'added.) "When one link
in the chain of title is wanting, there is no clue to guide the purchaser in his search to
the next succeeding link by which the chain is continued. The title upon the record is
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"If conveyances from one stranger to another, would be notice to all
the world,"--or, in other words, to persons interested in any and all
other lines of title--"miserable would be the situation of the purchaser." 149 Miserable because of the search thereby made necessary.
Up to this point the conclusion is that the deeds in questions give
no record notice, that they therefore call for no search, and that in
consequence they fall outside the recording system.
One question relating to both of the above situations is, however,
here postponed. If a subsequent purchaser, without record notice of
the hostile deeds in either situation, happens to have actual knowledge
of those deeds, or information that could lead him to such knowledge,
is he therefore "put upon inquiry"? Whether he can be put upon
inquiry as to anything, and if as to anything then as to what, and
what consequences could follow from his making no inquiry, will be
discussed below. 150
A second case to be distinguished from the problem first above
stated is that of a grantor who gives a warranty deed for land he has
never owned and later acquires the true title. The relation of this to
record notice will. be considered below (situation D) in the present
section, and its relation to inquiry notice in the following section,' 1 1 of
this discussion.
Situation B
The second of the six situations above indicated is that of easements. Must a purchaser who is interested in Blackacre search the
record titles surrounding tracts for evidence of easements held by
their owners in Blackacre? The weight of authority, and of reason,
support a negative answer. 152
However, when the "reason" given for this holding is that the
"titles" are distinct, this is even more unsatisfactory than in the first
situation. The question before a court is, should it be held that deeds
to other tracts give notice, and therefore constitute a danger from
the purchaser's protection, and when he has traqed the title down to an individual, out
Df whom the record does not carry it,"-except in the line upon which he relies--"the
registry acts make that title the purchaser's protection. The registry of a deed is notice only to those who claim through or under the grantor by whom the deed was
executed." Losey v. Simpson, ii N. J. Eq. 246, 249 (I856). This was a case of a
recorded mortgage given by a contract purchaser whose contract was by law not recordable. That the registration of the mortgage should in such case not give notice to
a subsequent purchaser of the legal title is clearly the sound view. See cases cited
(not all explicitly to this point) in 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2187-8 at notecall 55 et seq., 2211 at notecall 32, 2368, n. i, and § 630 (b).
x49. Keller v. Nutz, 5 S. & R. 246, 254 (Pa. i81g).
i5o. See text at and following notecall 335 infra.
151. See text at and following notecall 343 infra.
152. For cases, see 2 TiFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2188-90, who, however,
inclined to the contrary opinion. Compare the views in 2 DFvLim, op. cit. supra note 25,

§ 667 (semble).
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which only search can save the purchaser of Blackacre; and, here again,
merely to describe the circumstances out of which the question arises,
by saying that transfers of Whiteacre are not part of the title evidence
of Blackacre, would manifestly be no answer to that question. In fact,
however, the statement is also unacceptable on another ground. Given
various tracts of neighboring land, none held under an original patent,
the conveyancing history of any one of them must be common, as a
searcher goes farther back, to an increasing number of the others. The
lines of record ownership of any two of them must therefore cross; if
easements exist between them the titles of the dominant and servient
tenements must run through a common grantor. It is only their subsequent separate conveyancing history that can justify one in saying
that the two conveyances by that grantor do not relate to "the same
piece of land or a part thereof." Nevertheless, the law does, under
the majority view, regard the two tracts as independent from the date
of division, including tlie deed by which separation was effected. Even
the usual description of the situation presented by the problem is therefore to some extent inaccurate, in addition to being as a whole
irrelevant.
There is a similar confusion implicit in reasons given for the
majority and minority views. The minority view can claim in its
support the indubitable fact that the owners of the dominant and
servient tracts trace titles from a common course. The majority view
has been defended on the ground that the deed for the dominant tract
has the primary purpose of conveying title to it, and only incidentally
creates the easement in Blackacre. This is not particularly satisfying.
As a matter of legal analysis it must be admitted that a part of the
15
"title" to Blackacre is held by the owner of the dominant tenement.

3

But the law has not in practice reached that refinement of theory. It is
traditional to refer to the easement as a right "in another's land;" and
-balancing the sliver of ownership in one part against the aggregate
of liberties, powers, and claims that constitute "title" in the otherso it is, as a practical matter. This has the merit of simplicity, and
the refusal to require a prospective purchaser of Blackacre to search
the titles of all land around it 14 has the corresponding merit of convenience to him whose convenience should be preferred.
153. PHILBRICK, PROPERTY (1939) 8-11, 138-141, and index s. v. "Rights-

in rem."

154. There is -no reason in the principles of easements and profits why the dominant and servient tenements might not be considerably separated. However, because
of the limited list of recognized easements, and the predominance among them of those
which either presuppose adjoining tracts or (as in the case of ways and watercourses)
ordinarily involve an easement over all intervening land, the problem is in actuality
restricted to the land immediately adjoining.
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It is true that Mr. Tiffany (writing when the view just stated
was judicially a minority doctrine) has said:
"In such a case, at common law, the purchaser would take
subject to the easement previously'created, as being a legal interest, irrespective of whether he had notice thereof, and the rule
• could not well be regarded as changed by the adoption of
the recording law, as applied to a case in which the grant of the
easement does appear of record, though in connection with the
conveyance of other land, to which the easement is made appurtenant."

1"5

Mr. Tiffany also stated that the purchaser was "ordinarily"
charged with notice of the incumbrance shown in the title-chain of the
dominant tenement; but his language ("could not well" and "it seems")
would seem to suggest reluctance to accept that then slightly preponderant view. The reference to the rule at common law, being quite
irrelevant, is interesting only as an illustration of the tendency of
courts, already adverted to,' 5 6 to revert to the common law principle
which it was the quintessential purpose of the recording statutes to
repudiate. The sole question, under them, is whether notice should
be implied under the circumstances indicated. If the second grantee,
as a bona fide purchaser, takes clear of an earlier grant of complete
title, then a fortiorihe should take clear of a legal easement or equitable
restriction; although in the last case a court administering both law
and equity might be expected to be particularly attentive to equitable
considerations, since equitable restrictions, as distinguished from either
positive or negative legal easements, were never subject to Mr.
Tiffany's first proposition. 1 1 7 Mr. Tiffany's last proposition is, substantially, that a subsequent purchaser must, to save himself, read in
extenso every earlier recorded deed (not merely the description of the
land, which will show that it is not that which the searcher contemplates buying) given by every record owner in his chain of title. The
only exception would be, seemingly, that of deeds to land beyond the
county line; they never give notice-and that the county is the recording unit for public convenience, including that of purchasers, is obvious.
In addition to the objection that the proposition totally ignores the
test of reasonableness, it also overpasses even the broadest generally
155. 2 TIFFANY, OP. Cd . sipra note 17, at 2189.
(Italics supplied.) Mr. Tiffany
wrote before 1920; the decisions in courts of last resort were then 2 to i in favor of
his view. Compare dates of cases cited at note 167 infra.
156. At p. 148, and text at notecall 69 supra and following notecall 129 supra.
157. Ames, Specific Performance For and Against Strangers to the Contract
(1904) 17 HARV. L. REv. 174, 182. This point was properly heeded in Hancock v.
Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 674-6, 107 S. E. 872, 875-6 (i921).
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accepted conception of a chain-of-titleY' 8 A prior record owner of a
large tract might be such in scores of such chains; and even after
risking '" the exclusion of tracts deemed unlikely, on the basis of
geography, to be dangerous, there might remain many whose title
chains, under Mr. Tiffany's view, a purchaser would be obligated to
search. With reference to the general situation now in question Judge
Clark has stated that
"The rule is well settled that a purchaser takes with notice
from the record only of encumbrances in his direct chain of title.
Hence in the absence of actual notice, before or at the time of his'
purchase, an owner of land in the neighborhood is only bound by
the restrictions if they appear 160 in some deed of record in conveyances to himself and"-that is: or to some one of-"his direct
predecessors in title." 161
A recent Pennsylvania case, relying upon Mr. Tiffany, has held explicitly in accordance with his rather hesitant pronouncement. 16 2 On
the other hand the highest court of New Jersey has held that the subsequent purchaser protected by the statutes is one of the same land in
the narrow sense. already emphasized, and that absurd consequences
158. That is, not (r)of a particular chain of deeds purportedly carrying title, but
(2) all deeds by prior record owners actually transferring or incumbering the title to
the particular piece of land of which the searcher is a prospective purchaser. Compare
text following notecall 175 infra.
159. See text at notecall 154 supra. This matter is explicitly commented upon in
Gloriem v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. 199, 201, 96 Ati. 94, 95 (i915), and in Hancock v.
Gumm, 151 Ga. 667, 678, io7 S. E. 872, 877 (1921).

16o. Including, of course, recitals leading to other chains of title.
161. CLARK, REAT. COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "'RUN WITH THE

,AND" (1929)

162.

162. Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 AtI. 299 (1931). The opinion cites no pertinent authorities save indirectly through the citation of Mr. Tiffany; but see note 155
supra and note 167 infra. It cites one Pennsylvania case, Pyles v. Brown, 189 Pa. 164,
42 Atl. 1I (1899), that limited notice in another situation; two other Pennsylvania
cases that contain nothing whatever in support of the decision; two others for innocuous generalities (a deed gives notice "to those who are bound to search for it"--see
text at notecalls 26, 146 sapra and 174 infra; "notice of a deed is notice of its contents") ; Pomeroy for a repetition of the last quoted platitude; Kent for generalities
equally irrelevant-see note 26 supra.
But reliance was praced primarily upon the literal wording of our statute. The
sole provision quoted is that which requires that all deeds whereby the title to "any
lands . . . in this Commonwealth" may be in any way affected shall be recorded.
And so they must if they are not to be void against subsequent purchasers, as the unquoted portion of the statute provides. But the court has never construed that portion
to mean subsequent purchaser of "any land . . . in this Commonwealth," regardless
of where the deed is recorded. A deed to "land in A county" (which is common language), there recorded, is of course held not to give notice to a purchaser of "land in
B county;"--and that, unquestionably, rests upon reasonableness and convenience. See
text following notecall 157 supra. And if the court, considering lots in Delaware County, is thus free to ignore the supposed implication in the words "any land . . . in
this Commonwealth" for reasons of convenience and fairness, it must be free to set reasonable limits to notice within a county. And this, of course, it has often done, as, for
example, in one case cited by it, as above noted.
Being thus entirely free to set such limits, only one remark need be added to the
argument in the text against the view taken by the court in the instant case; namely,
that all of Pennsylvania was once held under one title.
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would, under many statutes, follow a contrary view. 0
further said:

3

The court

"The reason of the legislation and the argument ab inconvienti point to the same result. . . . A purchaser may well be
held bound to examine or neglect at his peril, the record of the
conveyances under which he claims, but it would impose an intolerable burden to compel him to examine all conveyances made
by every one in his chain of title." 164
The highest court of New York has given to both of these points, 63
and that of Georgia to the second, 1 6 explicit approval. This view is
indubitably dominant, 167 and preferable unless under special circumstances involving other equitable principles than the single one (notice)
operative in the record acts. 16 8
Situation C
Next is the problem presented by instruments that are actually,
although improperly, on the record. Assuming that these affect, either
in equity or at law, the title to the land-since otherwise they should
be wholly irrelevant as a matter of record notice (though not necessarily inquiry notice)-they may nevertheless be of a type not recog163. That is, when the statute-as in New Jersey and Pennsylvania (PA. STAT.
ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 21, § 444)-makes the unrecorded deed "void" against the
subsequent purchaser. "If subsequent purchaser means a purchaser from the same
grantor but of different land, then the owner of land by an unrecorded deed would be
unable to sue for a trespass if the trespasser happened to be a subsequent purchaser
from the same grantor'
Glorieux v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. i99, 202, 96 At. 94, 95
019,5).

164. Glorieu- v. Lighthipe, 88 N. J. L. 199, 203, 96 AtI. 94, 95-6

(915).

165. "This rule would seem to be implicit in the acts providing for the recording
of conveyances. Recording constitutes notice only of instruments in the chain of title
of the parcel granted. To have to search each chain of title from a common grantor
lest notice be imputed would seem to negative the beneficent purposes of the recording
acts." Buffalo Acad. of Sacred Heart v. Boehm Bros., 267 N. Y. 242, 250, 196 N. E.
42, 45 (1935), embodying Judge Clark's statement, above quoted, in the opinion at 250,
and following Schermerhorn v. Bedell, 163 App. Div. 445, 148 N. Y. Supp. 896 (4th
Dep't 1914), aff'd, 221 N. Y. 536, I6 N. E. 1074 (1917).
166. Hancock v. Gumm, 15I Ga. 667, 678, 107 S. E. 872, 877 (1921).
167. In addition to the three cases cited in notes 157 (Georgia), 159 (New Jersey), and 165 (New York) supra, see Beetchenow v. Arter, 45 R. I. 133, i19 At. 758
(1923) ; Yates v. Chandler, 162 Tenn. 388, 38 S. W. (2d) 70 (1930) ; Wichita Val. Ry.
v. Marshall, 37 S. W. (2d) 756 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931). Contra: King v. Union Trust
Co., 226 Mo. 351, 126 S. W. 415 (igog) ; Lewes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216
(915) ; Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931).
168. The decision in the New York case of Buffalo Acad. of Sacred Heart v.
Boehm Bros., 267 N. Y. 242, i96 N. E. 42 (I935), cited in note 165 supra, was limited
to situations "in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the consideration of which
we may well leave until they arise." The court very probably had in mind the Pennsylvania case of Finley v. Glenn, 303 Pa. 131, 154 Atl. 299 (1931), discussed in note
162 supra. The latter case was in equity, a bill for an injunction to restrain violation
of equitable building restrictions. Before the respondent (subsequent purchaser) began
building he had acquired knowledge of the restrictions and had been warned by the
owner of the alleged dominant tenement not to violate them. Under these circumstances, if the court was resolved to decide against the purchaser, its decision might
better have been rested on the doctrines of "hardship" or "discretion."
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nized by the local statute as recordable; for example, a contract for
the purchase and conveyance of the land. In this case, record notice
would of course likewise be denied. Finally, although of a nature to
affect the title and of a type authorized to be recorded they may nevertheless be unauthorizedly recorded, because unacknowledged or improperly acknowledged br otherwise deficient in the formal prerequisites to registration under the local statute. The question whether
either record notice (or inquiry notice-which will be discussed in
the next section) should be recognized as given by papers of either of
the last two classes is obviously one of public policy. The courts and
authoritative textwriters almost unanimously agree that no unjustifiably recorded instrument, no matter for what reason unjustifiably
recorded, can give constructive notice by the mere fact of its registration. 169 And this has probably been a settled principle from the infancy
of the recording system. 170 In the case of deeds for land in one state
that are acknowledged in another in a manner not satisfying the statute
of the former, provision is sometimes made by this that the defective
acknowledgment shall be taken prima facie as good in the state where
made, and shall therefore have, as evidence, the force of an original.'17
It seems clear that any concession beyond this could only be a
stultification of the recording acts; not to be supported if the public
policy underlying those enactments is to prove effectual.
Nevertheless, although that policy has been made effective in refusing record notice to instruments that are unauthorizedly registered,
these have not been consistently treated as nullities for all purposes in
connection with the recording system. The failure so to treat themthe attribution to them, on the contrary, of the power to give inquiry
notice-is the most striking illustration of judicial failure uniformly
and perseveringly to favor the subsequent purchaser. If, as has been
contended, that is in fact the underlying and desirable policy, then
many decisions have been wrong. But this will be considered below
as part of the problem of inquiry notice.
Situatibns D and F
Next come the two cases of dishonest but recorded conveyances
made, respectively, by one who has never held title and by one who has
169. See, for cases: 2 PoM-oy, op. cit. supra note i, §§ 65,-3; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit.
supra note 17, § 567, (b) and (c) ; Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 205; 2
DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 656-8, 661-2; 1 JONES, op. Cit. supra note 2, § 605.
170. See, for example, judge Trowbridge, loc. cit. supra note 29, at *582.
171. Such a statute was involved in Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 479-481 (1872),
repeatedly cited supra. Compare the Pennsylvania act, PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930)
tit. 21, § 263. On the evidence aspect, compare 5 WGMORr, EViDENcE (3d ed. 1940)
§ i676a.
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been both the true and the record owner but gives the conveyance in
question after parting, usually simultaneously, with both. Constructive
notice is given only by deeds that embody a title hostile to the purchaser. These conveyances are obviously nullities, and should be governed by the general principles that prevail with respect to recorded
deeds given by strangers to the title, discussed above under situation
A. It is therefore obvious that they should not be on the record; and
that, if there, they should not give constructive notice. 17 2 It is true
that the writers of various judicial opinions, and even some textwriters,
have assumed or suggested that they might give "notice." This suggestion, taken when possible in the sense most favorable to those using
it, may be read as meaning inquiry notice, and will be commented upon
1 73
below in considering that problem.
It has nevertheless seemed best to consider these two groups of
conveyances apart, and not as mere illustrations of situation A, for two
reasons. One of these is that it is desirable to emphasize here the
concept of a chain of title that is implicit in the decisions on these
classes of dishonest deeds preliminary to consideration of that concept in connection with the more perplexing problem of the class discussed in section V of this article. Another reason is the necessity of
discussing in situation D the applicability of the doctrine of title by
estoppel, a problem irrelevant to any other deeds covered by situation
A, for which reason its consideration above would have been inappropriate. Still another problem, which if not peculiar to situation F,
has been raised by Mr. Tiffany in connection with that, will be noted,
but since it involves inquiry notice only it will be further considered
below in section IV.
The original meaning of the phrase chain of title antedates the
recording system. An Englishman kept the deeds handed down from
his predecessors, and they constituted literally his chain of title-deeds.
Even under our recording system the record normally shows nothing
more than that simple case. A purchaser's duty to search has there172. With special reference to deeds given before holding title, see 2 POMEROy, op.
cit. supra note I, § 658, and 3 id. § 761 ; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit supra note 17, at 2131-3;
2 DEVI N, op. cit. supra note 25, § 723-4; PATRON, op. cit. supra note 9, §§ 44-5. It is
true that Mr. Pomeroy says only that the rule stated in the text is supported "by many
decisions,--it seems by the weight of authority," 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note i,
§ 658; and that Mr. Devlin states that it, "we believe, is sustained by the weight of
authority." 2 DEvLIN, op. cit. supra note 25, § 724. But these are certainly great under-

statements. It should also be noted that the purchaser should search not merely back
to the date of recording of a predecessor's deed, but back to the date of that deed, although the question has seemingly been very rarely adjudicated. Higgins v. Dennis,
1O4 Iowa 605, 74 N. W. 9 (898).
There are no discussions of deeds given after parting with record title, for the rea-

son indicated at p. i8o infra.
173. See on situation F text at notecall 335 et seq., and on situation D text at notecall 350 et seq., infra.
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fore often been loosely stated as though nothing more is required of
him than to find a deed to his prospective grantor, then one to that
grantee's grantor, and so on backward to a title that is original or of
supposedly dependable age; and such search does usually afford complete security.
The purchaser is concerned, however, not with a chain of deeds
but with one of record owners; yet not necessarily with but a single
chain thereof. The purpose of search is to discover any line or lines
of deeds for the same land, senior in age to that through which he
claims, originating with any of his record predecessors. As respects
the two cases here in question the situations are obviously very different. In the one, though a deed from the ostensible grantor is on
record he is not a record owner because he cannot be found as granteeneither actually being such nor, by hypothesis, so recorded. In the
other he is in the list of record owners, notwithstanding that his deed
in question is given after ceasing to be such.
Going back to the simple fact, above stated, of the search ordinarily made by any purchaser-to which recording requirements
should certainly approximate as nearly as possible-Judge Hare and
Mr. Wallace in their Notes, Mr. Pomeroy closely following them, Mr.
Rawle, and Mr. Tiffany all agree that the deeds given before acquiring
iitle give no notice.1 7 4 It is true that the reason often given or implied
for this view is that the deeds in question are outside the chain of title.
Through five editions of Mr. Pomeroy's work, for example, it has
been stated that a record gives notice to "those who must trace their
title from or through the grantor" who gives the instrument in question. Now, that is the case in the situations under discussion; yet
Mr. Pomeroy, ignoring that fact, drew from that principle the con1 75
clusion, in referring to situation D, that no notice is there given.
He described it as one of "a break in the chain of title." It is obvious
that he thereby assumed, and that in fact under the decisions in both
situations it is held, that the chain of title is constituted by conveyances
not only made by successive holders of the record title but made by them
while respectively holders thereof. In no other sense could the deeds
in question involve any break in or departure from the line of record
title. That this definition is completely in accord with, and promotive
of the purpose of, the recording system as already defined is manifest.
It covers decisions in all ordinary situations under the statutes. It
174. Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 210; 2 POMEROY, op. cit. supra note
i, §658; R.AwLa COVEANTS FOR TiTLE (5th ed. 1887) 4o6; 2 TIFFANY, op. cd. supra
note i, § 545 (e).
175. 2

POMEROY, o,. cit. supra note i, § 658, and 3 id. § 76r.
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also covers those involving deeds given by strangers to the title, generally-that is, those dealt with in situation A above; and it alone
rationalizes the two sub-situations of that group here discussed.
All this, however, still leaves open the question why there is no
notice; for it may again be emphasized that merely to describe the
circumstances in which notice is held not to exist is not to give an
answer to that question. The definition of a chain of title, in itself,
neither explains nor justifies anything. It is very significant that the
four authorities above mentioned--even Mr. Pomeroy-all treat the
question of notice as one of search. It is still more significant that the
first two authorities impliedly, and the last two explicitly, exclude
notice because excluding search, and exclude the latter because its
requirement would be unreasonable.' 7 6 As Mr. Rawle said, speaking
as one perfectly informed regarding the practices of title searchers and
the views of the profession: "No one would pretend that the search
for conveyance by his"-a purchaser's--"vendor should be made not
only since he acquired the title, but also extend to all time before he
had any title at all, and that the same search should be made against
every one in the line of title." 177 But even that does not state the requirement fully; for in theory the search must be made, as to all prior
owners, forward indefinitely, since the deeds might be recorded at any
time. The burden on the purchaser would be intolerable.
All the preceding applies equally to situations D and F. A
comparison with the four other abnormal recording situations here becomes desirable. In the two here in question it is plausible to explain
the exclusion of search, and therefore of notice, by saying that the
deeds fall outside the chain of title, because such is the fact under the
definition of that phrase here (and correctly) adopted. On the other
hand, in situations B and C above examined, and in situation E to be
later considered, the deeds all fall within this same definition of the
chain of title. So far therefore, as the deeds involved in these three situations are held not to give notice, that definition cannot serve even as a
simulated reason for such decisions, and their true basis must be found.
In situation C this is obviously mere respect for the provisions of the
recording act, which either explicitly declare or necessarily imply that
only instruments satisfying its prerequisites for recordation shall give
notice; in other words, public policy. But such decisions in situations
A, B, D, and F can be rested upon the principles that search controls
176. See passages cited in note 174 supra.
177. RAwLE, op. cit. supra note 174, at 4o6. (Italics added.) "If he must look
beyond the origin of the title under which he was 'purchasing' . . . there could be
no limit short of the vendor's life, and such requirement of purchasers would involve
land titles in such uncertainty that it would be impracticable to rely upon any investigation." Breen v. Morehead, 104 Tex. 254, 258, 136 S. W. io47, 1o48-9 (igii).
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notice, and that search is required only when it must reveal the hostile
claim without subjecting the purchaser to an unreasonable burden.
And these will be found likewise to control such decisions in situation
E, later considered. It is true that, in all cases, to hold that notice
should be excluded is to hold that the situation is outside the recording
system; and so it may be said that we use the recording principles of
notice and search as a means of deciding-that there is no recording
problem and therefore no need to apply those principles. Save as
respects situation E it should be quite sufficient to say simply that the
instruments in question are nullities, and therefore outside the recording system; the resort to the test of unreasonable search is, in the other
cases, a secondary or corroborative test. In situation D, however,
the assertion that the deed is a nullity must be.qualified by consideration of the doctrine of title by estoppel.
It is a curious fact that search and notice are commonly discussed
in connection with situation D, but not in dealing with situation F.
The ostensible conveyance given in either situation is no more and no
less "outside the chain of title" or preceded by a "break in the chain
of title" than in the other. This fact, if appreciated, and this reference
to the records, would suggest such discussion in both cases if in either,
notwithstanding that, as just said, the discussion is in both cases unnecessary, since the two classes of deeds are alike nullities (although
here, for the reasons above indicated,1 78 not discussed merely as such),
and therefore outside the field of the recording acts. For, the same
reason the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase cannot possibly
operate in either situation, since that doctrine requires, first of all, a
purchaser,by which is meant a taker of the legal title, who holds it in
cases outside the recording system clear of prior equities, and holds it
within and by operation of that system against an earlier grantee
divested of that title in his favor. It has already been pointed out that
there can be no such purchaser in the two situations now under consideration,' 7 9 because there is no title that the intending purchaser can
acquire (aside from the doctrine of title by estoppel operating in situation D). It follows that the recording acts do not apply, and also
that they, not applying, cannot alter the consequences of the fact just
stated. However, two reasons readily occur why discussions of situation F are ordinarily not, and those of situation D ordinarily are, in
terms of notice and search-that is, in terms of the recording system.
On one hand, the very statement of situation F calls attention to the
recording statutes and excludes their operation; the grantor has parted
178. See text following notecall 173 supra.
179. See p. 169 supra.
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with actual title by a recorded deed, therefore no subsequent would-be
purchaser can buy in good faith nor the statutes operate in his favor.
This is not true of cases in situation D, and, in addition, these have
acquired prominence primarily in connection with the doctrine of title
by estoppel. That doctrine, if allowed to operate, transforms an originally null record, incapable of barring a bona fide purchase, into a
valid record that is effective for that purpose. The very statement of
this situation, therefore, calls incidentally for discussion of the recording acts, since upon the decision depends the conclusion whether the
first deed is to be treated as null or valid, whether the case falls without
or within the statutes, and whether there can or cannot be a subsequent
purchase in good faith. 180
The cases involved under the estoppel doctrine are those in which
the non-owner's first and pretended conveyance is by a recorded warranty deed to B, and after subsequently becoming record owner of the
land thereby ostensibly granted he gives a second deed to C. Under
the estoppel doctrine, as applied in various states, B either acquires
title instantaneously upon its acquisition by his grantor or can claim it,
on principles of contract and specific performance, as a matter of personal rebutter 181 against the grantor and his privies. In one or the
other form the doctrine has been recognized in more than half of our
states, and is by statute an unqualified rule of property in slightly more
than a third.' 8 2 Mr. Rawle, a determined opponent of the theory,
noted its spread in the law of the last century. There is, of course, no
objection to the theory when applied solely between the original parties. As regards them, such a resort to a notional transfer of title,
and also the fictional character of a "privity" which some cases
attribute in words to the second grantee solely for the purpose of excluding actualprivity by diverting title from him, would not merit even
mention, since the end would be equitably justified. In truth, however, the decisions in this field illustrate the decadence of equity, 18 3
applying as they do mechanically, under circumstances manifestly little
i8o. Mr. Tiffany very rightly discusses situation D at length only under the problem of estoppel. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, § 545 (e). It is, as he elsewhere
says, "only by reason of that doctrine, that such a conveyance by one without title can in
any case be effective." 2 id. § 567 (e). This clearly evidences his own opinion on the
question of search, but he proceeds to say merely that the cases are not in harmony
thereon.
181. RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 174, § 245-6, 255.
182. For cases and views see PATTON, op. cit. supra note 9, § 125-9 (citing in
§ 126, n. i99, statutes of 17 states which adopt the doctrine in the first form), also §§ 45,
46, n. 76, 44, n. 67; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit supra note 17, H 545, 567 (e) ; RAWLE, op. cit.
supranote 174, H 179-I82, 255 et seq.; Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 211-2;
2 DEVLIN, op. cit. supra note 25, §§ 721-2; 2 POMaOY, op. cit. supra note I, § 658. The
line between the two forms of the doctrine is not sharply drawn in these citations.

183. Cf. Pound, The Decadence of Equity (195o)

5 COL. L. Ray.

20.
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considered, a principle of conscientious conduct for an end that does
obvious injustice to third persons, the very persons who are entitled
to special favor under the policy of the recording acts.
Since, as will be seen, the doctrine completely ignores the principles, and indeed the existence, of the recording acts, its basis should
first be considered as a purely equitable problem. So considered, it
must be conceded that it is one of some difficulty. The worthless deed
is properly construed by equity as a covenant to convey the land, and
puts that obligation on the conscience of the wrongdoer, but no
equitable relief is possible, the only available remedy being the recovery
of damages at law. The grantee d6es have an equity, however, to
secure what he paid for.18 4 When title is later acquired by the grantor
it would be proper to compel its con-.eyance, provided this enforcement
in his favor of one equity is not made in disregard of an intervening
equity of higher rank held by the second grantee. As regards that,
both give value. Both, too, are equally innocent unless, contrary to
our momentary assumption, their relation to the recording acts is considered. The rights of the second grantee have been characterized
above as "intervening," and the Supreme Court of Michigan has repudiated theestoppel doctrine on the ground that it applies the doctrine
of relation back against an innocent third party.' 8 5 Since by hypothesis
the estopped grantor acquires title before giving the second deed, it
might be replied to this objection that, as respects an instantaneous
transfer of title, there is no possibility that the second grantee can be
an intervening party; that even though the title passes when acquired,
that moment is before the second grant, and no application is necessary
of the doctrine of relation backward. But this answer leaves untouched
the question whether title, when acquired, should pass by the "estoppel
deed."
The answer to that should depend upon the principle that equity
should always look through form to substance. Regarded substantively, the right of the first grantee cannot be higher than one for
specific performance.'8 6 If the courts had put the problem on that
basis it would have been impossible to overlook the refusal of that
remedy in a host of cases where it would entail injustice, or to overlook
184. RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 174,

§§ 245-6,

265.

,85. A purchase money mortgage was given before the deed conveying title was
delivered; then, when this was delivered, a second mortgage was given to a person
present when delivery was made. Priority was given to the latter, on the ground that
the circumstances constituted notice that until then the mortgagor had no encumberable
title. Heffron v. Flanigan, 37 Mich. 274 (1877).
I86. Cf. 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, § 545 at notecall 13; RAWLE, op. cit.
supra note 174, §§ 255, 265.
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the fact that estoppel is likewise often restrained by counter equities.' 8 7
Moreover, it is the office of equity to grow. The first grantee's negligence will not deprive him of the right to have damages; but clearly
those decisions are sound which hold that, even in jurisdictions recognizing automatic passage of title, he should not be deprived of his
election to take either damages or the title by forcing the latter upon
him.8'8 However, it also seems clear that his "negligence" should bar
him of that equitable relief even if he should prefer it. All "equities"
are merely claims to judicial consideration on the basis of fair treatment; all have originated in distinctions between conscionable and unconscionable conduct. Courts of equity have freely denied specific
performance on determinations of conduct under business conventions.'8 9 It would seem that similar determinations of conduct might
not merely as well be based but positively should be based on regard
or disregard for a declared public policy making priority of land titles
depend upon consultation of a record; and if this be so, then the second
grantee would have an equity, or claim for judicial protection, superior
to that of the first grantee.
Such action, notwithstanding the fact, earlier noted, that negligence in general has not as a matter of traditional technical equity
been recognized as inequitable conduct, 190 would seem to be in line
with a strengthening tendency in equity's action in other fields of
law. 191 It has already been pointed out, that it is not only justifi187. Cf. 2 CHAFEE & SIMPSON, CASES ON EQUITY (1934) c. IO; 2 TIFFANY, op.
cit. supra note 17, § 545 (e), in the text at notecall 58; RAwIE, op. cit. Supra note 174,
at 375, 382; BIGELow, A TREATISE ON TIRE LAv OF ESTOPPEL- (5th ed. i89o) 436, on
certain Pennsylvania cases.
188. RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 174, §§ 179-182, 258; PATTON, Op. Cit. supra note 9,
§§45 at notecall 77, 125-I3o, especially 129; 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2II9.
189. 2 CHAFEE & SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 187, c. io. The opinions talk in general of fraud or sharp practice.
19o. See text at notecall 73 et seq., supra.
191. Specific performance of contracts has often been refused against one who
made a "mistake" in entering into it, and it is traditional to classify such cases under
that heading. But the mistake is very often forgetfulness, inattention, carelessness, or
recklessness-varying types of negligence. The true reason for refusing enforcement
is the "hardship" that would result therefrom in view of the mistake, and some of the
cases identical in facts with the others are so classed. For striking illustrations, see
Mason v. Armitage, 13 Ves. 25 (Ch. i8o6) ; Webster v. Cecil, 3o Beav. 62 (Ch. 1861) ;
Malins v. Freeman, 2 Keen 25 (Ch. 1837); Tamplin v. James, 15 Ch. D. 215 (88o)
(protection refused) ; Sullivan v. Jennings, 44 N. J. Eq. II (1888) ; Kelley v. York
Cliffs Improvement Co., 94 Me. 374, 47 Atl. 898 (1900). Cases are collected in 2
CHAFEE & SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 187, c. 10, § 2.
It is certainly not explicit doctrine that such negligence is an inequity, merely
overbalanced by the inequity of imposing hardship by ordering specific performance;
or that, in rescission and reformation, where the complainant's "equity" must be greater,
the equity there administered is merely a preponderance in his favor of the inequity of
refusing relief over his inequity of negligence. But that would seem to be the truth.
No equity is, finally, other than a claim upon chancery's aid under all the circumstances
of a situation. Mr. Pomeroy thought that mistake could be distinguished from negligence. 3 PoMRoY, op. cit. supra note 1, § 839. But that is clearly impossible in many
cases, even if negligence be defined as in tort law. The word negligence is employed
to some extent with reference to these situations of mistake; and there is a growing
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able under, but seemingly positively required by, the recording
acts. 192 Equity's longtime tenderness for the inexperienced has
prevented a sufficiently marked distinction between blameless and
blameworthy mistakes. In England, where there has been no general
recording system, a purchaser's failure to inquire regarding titledeeds, and all the more his proceeding with his purchase with knowledge that the vendor does not hold them, has been treated as
"culpable neglect." 19' In this country, it is certainly negligence in
the first grantee to purchase from one without record title; and, in
view of statutory recording policy, why should not that negligence,
coupled with failure to record after gaining title, be fatal as against a
subsequent purchaser who, otherwise, admittedly acts bona fide?
But this carries us over the line into consideration of the recording
acts. Under them, since they should bind all courts equally, there can
be no doubt respecting the proper solution of the problem. The first
deed is taken by one who is conclusively adjudged to have known that
he dealt with one who was not record owner, and that the proffered
deed might at least possibly be a nullity. In consequence, his "equity,"
though prior in time, is manifestly of a lower rank than that of the
second grantee who consults and relies upon the record. The latter
can have no constructive notice from the first deed while it is admittedly
a nullity, and it has seemingly never been explicitly suggested that it
should give record notice from the instant the later acquired title of
the grantor passes into or through it, whereas there are some suggestions that it could do so only after a re-recording. 19 4 H-However, no
matter when recorded the instrument itself cannot reveal the presence
body of dicta and holdings in favor of refusing equitable aid to one guilty of negligence
or of "gross" negligence. Compare 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACrS (rev. ed. 1937) §§ 1427,
1496, which cites among other cases Krieger v. Rizzo, 1O5 Pa. Super. 429, 161 Atl. 483

(1932), Bosler v. Sun Oil Co., 325 Pa. 411, 421, 19o AUt. 718, 722 (1937) ; 3 Coos,
CASES ON EQUITY: REFORMATION, RESCISSION, AND RESTITUTION (2d ed. 1932) pt. I,
c. 5; notes in 2 CHAFEE & SIMPSON, op. cit. supra note 187, c. IO.
192. See text at pp. 15I-5 supra.
193. 2 POMEROY,. op. cit. supra note I, § 612.

194. As in PATTON, op. cit. supra note 9, § 45. There are rare judicial statements

which imply that it is an open question whether the void deed gives record notice. Mr.
Aigler quotes one such passage in his CASES ON TITLES To REAL PR PERTY (2d ed.
1932) 935, n. 31; reprinted in 2 AIGLER, BIGELOW & POWELL, CASES ON PROPERTY

(1942) 890, n. 48. It is surprising that Mr. Aigler makes this suggestion elsewhere as
his own: "Whether he shall prevail on the basis of the estoppel operative in his favor
as against a subsequent purchaser from the same grantor may conceivably depend, in
part at least, upon whether such recordiiW prevents the later grantee from being a purchaser without notice." And again: "attention should be directed to the question
whether the subsequent claimant may be deemed to take with notice merely because
the estoppel deed was placed on record." AIGLER, op. cit. supra, at 866, n. 2o, at 936, n.
32; reprinted in2 AIGLER, BIGELOW & POWELL, op. cit. supra, at 827, n. 28, at 891, n. 90.
(Italics supplied.)

These references, as the italicized words show, can refer only to

constructive notice by the mere recording, not to inquiry notice (on which see text following notecall 353 infra).
The necessity of a re-recording was suggested by Reynolds,
v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97, 1O2 (1824).

J.,

dissenting in Tefft
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and operation of a legal rule, and the general basis of record notice is
admittedly the feasibility of discovering from a record the danger to
the subsequent purchaser which it involves. "The policy of the recording acts is that those persons who are affected with constructive
notice should be able to obtain an actual notice, and even full knowledge, by means of a search." 15 This is assumed in all decisions on
independent and broken chains of title. That record notice by such an
instrument is impossible, under the principles generally observed, must
therefore be conceded. It will be shown below that, for the same'
reason, a subsequent purchaser cannot be "put upon inquiry" by the
recording of such an instrument '9 6 -notwithstanding that it may be
fatal to his title quite aside from any question as to his good and bad
faith. Consequently, the subsequent grantee can be held a mala fide
purchaser only by the receipt of information off the record of the existence of the estoppel deed and of its possible or probable legal effect
adversely to his claim.
It has been said that the definition of a chain of title is vital in the
situations here in question. If the definition stated above were adhered
to, no court could logically hold a subsequent purchaser bound to
search for, nor therefore to be endangered by, the earlier and recorded
estoppel deed. The courts which deny priority to that deed base their
holdings on those principles.1 97 But one cannot therefore say that
where the contrary view prevails the phrase chain of title has a different
meaning. Such decisions are more properly to be regarded as exceptions to, or made in disregard of, the ordinary rule that field of search
and field of record title are identical. It would, it is believed, be as
easy to compile from the Reports of any state giving precedence to the
estoppel grantee as from those of one protecting the subsequent purchaser judicial pronouncements implying or explicitly declaring the
same definition of chain of title.
The Supreme Court of Connecticut repudiated the estoppel doctrine with the following comments:
"It may be said that such estoppel by deed is not an equitable
doctrine, but is a rule of the common law based upon the recitals
or covenants of the deed. We reply, that as a rule of law it has
been so far modified by the registry laws as to be no longer applicable to cases where its enforcement would work such an injus195. 2 PomERoy, op. cit. spra note i, § 653. Compare text at notecall 26 and following notecalls 146, x74 supra.

ig6. See text at and following notecall 350 infra.
197. Mr. Patton's classification of cases seems to imply different meanings of chain
of title, rather than attention to and disregard of a definition everywhere accepted.
PATrO,, op. cit. supra note 9, § 129 at notecall 222, and § 45. A number of the states
that give priority to the estoppel grantee have a tract recording system, and in those
the ordinary meaning of a title chain does not, of course, exist. Id. § 44, n. 67.
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tice as to give priority to the title of one who negligently failed to
examine the records before purchasing of a grantor having no
title, or who purchased at the risk that his grantor might thereafter acquire title, over that of a subsequent purchaser in good
faith and in reliance upon the title as it appeared of record. 'The
whole system of registering deeds of land would become of no
value if a purchaser could not rely upon the records as he finds

them'."

198

Mr. Rawle said of the doctrine that its
"result . . ., when applied to the case of a bona fide purchaser
without notice, cannot harmonize with the spirit of the registry
acts in force in this country, and leads to the position, which certainly cannot be considered as tenable, that a purchaser must
search the registry of deeds, not only from the time when his
grantor acquired title, but . . . before that time, in order to
discover whether he had previously made any conveyance (though
without title) to any other person; . . . and if the property
has passed through several hands, a similar search must be made
with respect to every one through whose hands the title has thus
passed." 199
Finally, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island, referring to the views
of the American annotators of Smith's Leading Cases, 20 0 and of Mr.
Rawle, has said:
"The argument in support of these views is certainly very
strong, if not theoretically unanswerable; but the doctrine impugned has been so often and so fully recognized in the courts,
and repeated in the text-books, that we feel bound, out of regard
for the security of titles, to follow the precedents. . . . And it
may be remarked that the doctrine, however much it may be at
variance with the spirit, does not violate the letter of the recording
acts . . . we think a statute is called for in view of this state of
the law, in order to carry into full effect the policy of our recording
act, and to prevent its operating, in cases of this kind, as a snare
rather than as a protection to purchasers." 201
198. Wheeler v. Young, 76 Conn. 44, 49, 55 Atl. 67o, 672 (19o).

(Italics sup-

plied.) See also RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 174, at § 259 et seq., and 2 TIFFANY, op.
cd. supra note 17, at 2130-3.
199. RAWLE, op. cit. supra note 174, at 403-4. Such a search is also recognized as
a "very serious burden" in 2 TIFFANY, op. cit. supra note 17, at 2132.
2oo. Hare & Wallace, loc. cit. supra note 34, at 211-2.
201.

McCusker v.McEvey, 9 R. I. 528, 532-3 (1870).

